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ABSTRACT 
This master thesis explores how a transition from progressive tax schemes to flat tax 
schemes in OECD countries affects economic growth in terms of output, focusing on the 
period from 1997 to 2007. I present and compare academic and empirical evidence on the 
relation between taxation and economic growth in order to estimate the most probable 
effect on the economy of implementing flat tax schemes in the OECD countries. A meta-
regression analysis on 18 calibration articles on the subjects of tax reforms provides robust 
results of the mean tax elasticity from the studies, and also the transformation into long run 
growth is robust. The average growth potential is summarized to 6.75 percent, translating 
into a growth potential of 9.16 percent in real output for the OECD area based on the 
2006/2007 level of tax progressivity and tax elasticity. Controlling for estimation bias in 
parameter coefficients and prediction model, the conclusions remain robust. 
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For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it 
ought to be so in all affairs of government. As a government ought to make no distinction of 
persons or classes in the strength on their claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from 
them should be made to bear as nearly as possible  with the same pressure upon all; which, it 
must be observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole. If any one 
bears less than his fair share of the burden, some other person must suffer more than his 
share, and the alleviation to the one is not, on the average, so great a good to him, as the 
increased pressure upon the other is an evil. Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of 
politics, means equality of sacrifice. It means apportioning the contribution of each person 
towards the expenses of government, so that he shall feel neither more nor less 
inconvenience from his share of the payment than any other person experiences from his. 
This standard, like other standards of perfection, cannot be completely realized; but the first 
object in every practical discussion should be to know what perfection is. 
John Stuart Mill in Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Chapter II (1900) 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
What is the role of government in promoting economic growth? Most economists and policy 
makers agree on the role of government as provider of sound economic policies in terms of 
optimal framework conditions for growth and prosperity. As Mankiw (1998) states in his 8th 
principle of economics: “A country’s standard of living depends on its ability to produce 
goods and services.” However, highly different opinions arise when this is brought down to 
government policies in action, in terms of level of interaction or measures to be used. Fiscal 
policy is no exception. 
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How to design and implement a tax scheme has been an important governmental activity 
ever since the origin of tax. In the well established Western European countries, as well as in 
the US, the governments have over time added to and amended the tax system for 
redistributive and other well-meaning purposes, or as plain political statements. Caplan 
(2007) posts that voters, irrational by rational reason, yields the evident suboptimal policy 
developments. This is confirmed by Avinash and Londregan (1998) in that they find 
redistributive politics to favor the middle class at the expense of both rich and poor1. As a 
result most of today’s tax schemes in these countries are not easily to understand and 
comply with, even for professionals. A rationale for this may be the finding by Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (2008) in that salient taxes yield more responsiveness than hidden taxes. 
Unfortunately, these tax schemes create significant efficiency gaps in the economies2
One benefit of globalization is the removal of the government monopolies; as labor and 
capital become increasingly mobile across country borders, governments have to face 
competition from other countries in terms of framework conditions (Vietor (2007)), such as 
climate, infrastructure, social security, employment, liberty, and taxation. Edwards and de 
Rugy (2002) apply the public choice theory put forward by Charles Tiebout on competition 
between countries, reasoning that competition between countries increases government 
efficiency. As Bohacek and Kejak (2005) find; even if the aggregates are important, the 
behavioral effects on individuals are crucial in obtaining the aggregates (in a fiscal sense). 
Whereas some of these framework conditions are outside of the governments’ sphere of 
influence (climate), the others are in many countries considered as regulatory framework 
and dictated without hesitation. However, most of the OECD countries are reluctant to alter 
the tax conditions in order to attract labor and capital, under the assumption of that 
reducing taxes is bad for the economy. There are however signs of improvements. Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) find evidence for corporate tax competition between OECD 
countries in terms of statutory tax rates, effective average tax rates, and effective marginal 
tax rates. This is confirmed by an exposition for the Norwegian Parliament (Gotaas (2007)) 
. 
1 Intuitively this is easily illustrated by the median voter hypothesis, which posts that political parties will make 
an effort to get as close as possible to satisfy the median voter in order to win the election, while 
simultaneously maintaining diversity from competitors. For the OECD countries the median voter is found in 
the middle class. 
2 A less moderate understanding of the impact of taxes is found in Adams (2001) where he explains world 
history from a taxation perspective. 
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stating that the tax reforms in OECD countries are to improve the countries’ 
competitiveness. An increasing number of non-OECD countries have lowered the price of 
residing and making money (i.e. tax), pressuring the high-tax OECD countries to respond in 
order to retain labor and capital. 
Under the current global conditions with crisis in the financial, banking and real economy 
sectors one of the aids pleaded by workers and businesses is tax cuts. This could be a very 
good time for introducing a flat rate tax scheme in all OECD countries. Businesses and 
citizens want relief from the governments, and introducing a fundamental tax reform will 
give all relief that lasts. Lower tax burden, reduced compliance costs, increased incentives, 
and not least, fair treatment will be the benefits for the tax payers, whereas the benefits for 
the governments are reduced compliance control costs and possibly increased tax income. A 
long term recession demands a long term solution. According to the OECD Secretary-
General, 
How and from whom tax is raised matters, not just how much. One can easily imagine that a 
broad-based but low rate tax system is effective in resource terms. And a simple, fair and 
transparent system that operates with broad social consensus is important for good 
governance and compliance. 
Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, Doha, 29 November 20083
3 Source: OECD – Mobilising domestic financial resources for development. 
[http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_201185_41765091_1_1_1_1,00.html] (Accessed 
30.11.2008) 
. 
Introducing flat tax schemes in the OECD countries is a proper response to this statement.  
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1.2 Research Question 
The focus of this thesis is the de facto relation between taxation and economic growth in 
terms of incentive and disincentive effects from tax schemes. The research question is: 
What will be the long run economic growth effects from an introduction of flat tax schemes 
in the OECD countries in terms of output? 
Studies and statistics indicate that flat tax schemes boost growth. To retain competitiveness 
and to overcome the global recession a viable fiscal policy enhancement for the OECD 
countries still having progressive tax schemes might be to follow suit and implement flat tax 
schemes. 
 
1.3 Objective 
The objective for the master thesis is to present and compare academic and empirical 
evidence on the relation between taxation and economic growth in order to estimate the 
most probable effect on the economy of implementing flat tax schemes in the OECD 
countries. Of current interest is the increasing number of countries implementing flat tax 
schemes, the notion of tax competition, and a stagnating global economy. These issues will 
be discussed with regards to the thesis objective. 
 
1.4 Report Design 
Section 2 presents recent issues and trends within the field of taxation. Section 3 describes 
the methodology for this thesis, and section 4 presents theory and model framework, 
including the Hall-Rabushka flat tax. Section 5 reviews academic literature derived with the 
purpose of a meta-regression analysis by which the differences between the articles are 
studied in terms of output growth effects by changes in tax progressivity.. In section 6 the 
meta-regression analysis is performed, and in section 7 the results are extended into 
9
qualified estimations on an OECD flat tax scenario as opposed to the current progressive tax 
schemes. Section 8 concludes and suggests further research. 
 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
In this section I define central terms used in this paper. I provide a brief overview of current 
tax structure in the OECD countries, and in countries in the flat tax club. Current scenarios 
and trends within taxation are discussed where I also present some studies proving the case 
for flat tax reforms. 
 
2.1 Definitions 
Economic growth is the increase in a country’s production of goods and services from one 
period to the next. In this paper economic growth is measured as real gross domestic 
product. 
Proportional tax schemes levy one single tax rate on all income for all taxpayers regardless of 
income level. No deductions are granted, and all loopholes are extinguished. Most value 
added tax and social security schemes are proportional. 
Flat tax schemes levy one single tax rate on all income for all taxpayers regardless of income 
level. The flat tax is however not a strictly proportional tax scheme, as some progressivity 
exist in that a basic deduction for persons is granted to limit the tax burden of the poor. All 
other deductions and loopholes are however extinguished. Some OECD countries and 
several non-OECD countries has switched from highly progressive tax schemes to flat tax 
schemes, often accompanied by low tax rates. 
Progressive tax schemes levy low tax rates on small incomes and high tax rates on large 
incomes. Hence the share of tax burden is increasing. In addition numerous deductions are 
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often implemented for distributive or behavior-directing policy reasons. Most OECD 
countries still use this type of tax scheme. 
The OECD countries (i.e. OECD – Total in tables and figures) covers the 30 OECD Member 
countries; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States4
The Flat Tax Club consist of the countries and jurisdictions Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Guernsey, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Illinois (US), Indiana (US), Iraq, Jamaica, Jersey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Massachusetts (US), Mauritius, Michigan (US), Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Pennsylvania (US), Pridnestrovie, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovak Republic, Trinidad, Ukraine, and Uri (Switzerland)
. 
5
2.2 Current Tax Structure in the OECD Countries 
. 
  
Most OECD countries have as mentioned progressive tax schemes. KPMG’s Individual 
Income Tax Rate Survey 2008 shows that the tax levels have been slightly reduced over the 
past 5 years. For 13 countries the effective income tax and social security rates have been 
reduced. The flat tax countries Czech Republic and Slovak Republic has now half of the initial 
rates, whereas Iceland has seen a 20 percent increase (which the flat tax reform barely 
reduced). For 12 countries the effective income tax and social security rates have not 
changed at all. Figure 5 to figure 5 shows the tax structure based on OECD statistics. 
 
4 Source: OECD country Web sites: Country Web Pages 
[http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html] (Accessed 
10.11.2008) 
5 Source: Edwards and Mitchell (2008), Alvin Rabushka: Flat Tax – Essays on the Adoption and Results of the 
Flat Tax Around the Globe. [http://flattaxes.blogspot.com/], Wikipedia: Flat tax 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_tax] (Accessed 14.10.2008) 
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2.3 Current Flat Tax Structures Worldwide 
The number of jurisdictions joining the Flat Tax Club and implementing flat tax schemes is 
steadily increasing. Latest members of the flat tax club are Belarus and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, introducing 12 and 10 percent flat rate taxes, respectively, effective 
as of 2009; as well as the Swiss Canton of Uri, introducing a 15.4 percent flat rate tax6
Figure 4
. The 
countries and jurisdictions are however highly diverse, as are the flat tax schemes 
implemented.  shows the 2008 income tax rates for 25 flat tax jurisdictions. 
Figure 4: The Flat Tax Club – Income Tax Rates, 2008 
 
Source: Edwards and Mitchell (2008) 
6 Source: Alvin Rabushka: Flat tax – Essays on the Adoption and Results of Flat Tax Around the Globe. 
[http://flattaxes.blogspot.com/] 
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Evans and Aligica (2008) study the implementation of the flat tax in Central and Eastern 
Europe (several versions, none pure Hall-Rabushka flat tax or strictly proportional tax 
schemes) using a comparative study. They find that ideas, interests and consequences are 
prerequisites for all cases. For some preceding cases ideas are sufficient. E.g. Mart Laar, 
Prime Minister of Estonia, based the flat tax reform on the thoughts of Hayek and Friedman 
(Evans (2006)). The conditions for implementing flat tax might hence be transferrable to the 
OECD countries. Evans (2006) argues that belief in the normative approach to flat tax was a 
key in many of the now flat tax countries. After some time, when econometric and 
operational experience from the flat tax is obtained, this has been the foundation for the 
other countries for implementing the flat tax. In Fraser Forum (February 2008) Patrick 
Basham describes political obstacles hindering the introduction of flat tax schemes in 
Western countries, namely interest groups who are willing to keep it complicated for own 
benefit. 
 
2.3.1 Effects from Flat Tax Reform on Economic Growth 
Forbes (2005), Heath (2006), and Edwards and Mitchell (2008) highlight the subsequent 
growth from introducing flat tax in several countries. In Gotaas (2007) the statistics for 
Estonia show that whereas pre-tax reform GDP growth was negative, post-tax reform GDP 
growth has ranged between 0.3 and 11.4 percent annually, averaged at 7.5 percent. As the 
flat tax was implemented along with several other reforms it is however difficult to 
determine the isolated tax-reform effect. This is also the case for many other tax reforms; 
they are combined with other efficiency-improving reforms. However, the mere fact that 
most of these countries experience significant increasing economic growth provides solid 
fundament for expecting similar effects for the OECD countries.  
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2.4 Current Scenarios and Trends 
OECD reports a 0.1 percent decline in output for 3rd quarter of 20087
The OECD countries have the later years reduced corporate taxes substantially, and now the 
individual income taxes are also in a downward trend. There is also a global trend that 
income taxation is reduced in favor of indirect taxation; value added taxes, sales taxes, 
customs fees etc. The reason might be partially due to the experience of increasing tax 
income as shown in 
. In this period two 
OECD countries have a 1 percent or larger increase in output. The two countries are Slovak 
Republic and Czech Republic, which both have flat tax schemes. Is this a coincidence? The 
indication of the potential effects of flat tax reforms is anyway intriguing. 
figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Corporate Tax Rates Fall and Revenues Rise, Average of 19 OECD Countries 
 
     Source: Edwards and Mitchell (2008): Figure 6.1 
 
7 OECD Quarterly National Accounts: OECD area GDP down 0.1% in the third quarter of 2008. News release 20.11.2008 
[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/27/41700068.pdf] Accessed 29.11.2008 
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The effect is equivalent to what Niskanen and Moore (1996) find with regards to the Reagan 
tax cuts, that lower tax rates improved the US economy on 8 out of 10 key economic 
variables. Similar effects can be found for the Thatcher supply-side policies in UK. 
Increasing focus is paid to the distortionary effects of taxation. An OECD study on the effects 
of taxation on economic growth finds that both business and individual taxes reduce 
economic growth (Arnold (2008)). King and Rebelo (1990) find that national taxation can 
substantially affect long-run growth rates. Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) find that a 
country’s long-run economic performance is determined primarily by the institutions and 
government policies that make up the economic environment, of which physical capital and 
educational attainment is only a partial reason. Romer and Romer (2007) use a narrative 
methodology in analyzing the relation between legislation and changes in output. They find 
that tax increases are highly contractionary. A Norwegian government exposition by Stølen, 
Gjems-Onstad, Rasmussen, Røtnes, Mathisen Sletteberg, Torp, Winsnes, Berner, Gerdrup, 
Moen, and Andersen (1999) states that there exist costs for the real economy associated 
with high tax rates when citizens find tax planning profitable even when accompanied by 
transaction costs. They also recommend that the tax scheme be less progressive. 
The Pareto’s Principle, or the rule of 80/20, was derived from wealth inequality, and there is 
a probability that it is still present in income distribution, and more important, in income 
creation. Stokey (1980) states that while the high-income groups may be a minority in 
headcount, their economic importance is not. The high-income groups also have higher tax 
elasticity due to better knowledge and hence high marginal tax rates which mostly apply to 
high-income groups will have severe distortionary effects on the economy. 
Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983) study the efficiency gains from a dynamic tax reform 
based on general equilibrium rational expectations growth path of life cycle economies. The 
model incorporates effects of changes in tax progressivity and tax base, and is applied to a 
switch from the US tax system (proportionally approximated) to proportional tax on either 
consumption or labor income. They find that a flat consumption tax will increase lifetime 
welfare of all future generations by 2 percent, whereas a flat labor income tax will decrease 
welfare by similar amount. However, applying an initial progressive tax structure yields 
increases in both reforms by 7.08 and 4.24 percent, respectively. This illustrates that even 
16
minimal progressivity in the income tax structure has a large efficiency cost, and that tax 
progressivity may be as important as the tax base. 
 
Prescott (2004) finds that when the US and European tax rates were comparable the labor 
supply was also comparable, and that most differences between US labor supply and 
Germany and France 1970 – 1974 are due to differences in tax schemes. For Italy on the 
other hand institutional constraints in the labor market and unemployment benefits are 
more important. 
Grecu (2004) suggests a dual fiscal system taxpayers would be able to choose between the 
progressive tax system with all its reliefs and deductions, and a simple flat tax scheme with 
only a basic deduction. 
Kukk (2007) differ substantially from other literature on the relation between taxation and 
economic growth, in that he finds that all government revenue categories have positive 
effects on growth. This result is obtained by simultaneously controlling for government 
expenditure and budgetary deficits. This approach is somewhat problematic however, as 
revenue and expenditure in general cancels out, the result being budgetary surplus or 
deficit. Implicit the growth is determined by the budget balance, regardless of government 
revenue and expenditure being 10 or 90 percent of GDP – this is not very likely. Hence the 
relation between government revenue and growth has to be analyzed separately in order to 
infer on the associations, similarly for government expenditure. The finding in Kukk (2007) is 
also contrary to the OECD study by Leibfritz, Thornton, and Bibbee (1997) which states that 
“the increase in the average (weighted) tax rate of about 10 percentage points over the past 
35 years may have reduced OECD annual growth rates by about 0.5 percentage point”. 
The amount of academic effort on the subject of flat tax, and the increasing number of real 
life examples shows a trend in tax competition between countries in order to attract capital 
and labor, which inevitable paves way for more Western countries to grasp the flat tax 
opportunity for increased growth. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The fundament for the further progress of the paper is the review of academic and empirical 
literature on the current topic. A search for "flat*tax*", "proportional*tax*", “linear*tax*”, 
"tax reform" in JSTOR retrieves 7805 references. Limiting to articles only, still 4373 
references are available. A similar search in NBER for the same subjects produces 1090 
working papers. This amount will however require a more extensive research than 
appropriate for this paper. Excluding “tax reform”, which obviously will remove some articles 
regarding flat tax, still I find 1042 JSTOR articles on the flat tax issue. Including “economic 
efficiency”, “efficiency effects” in the search results in 488 references, which is a viable 
amount for reviewing, assuming that not all articles will be relevant. I have based the meta- 
analysis on the JSTOR articles and other relevant resources found through the articles. 
To include a study in the meta-regression analysis there are two conditions which must be 
fulfilled. First, the study must concern fiscal effects on economic efficiency. Second, the 
study must present an econometric or simulated estimate of the economic output or 
sufficient information to calculate it. In effect, most of the studies reviewed appear 
unsuitable for a meta-regression analysis. They are either reviews on the topic, or they are 
based on models not described or referred to in the article, or the effects on output are not 
reported and not possible to calculate for the estimates presented.  
Most of the articles I use in the meta-regression analysis present more than one measure. 
Stanley and Jarrell (1998) provide a useful discussion on this matter. Multiple measures from 
one article are used only when representing different model frameworks. If the author(s) 
have preferred one particular measure this is chosen. Otherwise I have estimated the 
elasticity extremes and the used the average elasticity for the concerning article. I have 
summarized the literature research in table 1, describing properties of 18 studies (n = 19) on 
flat tax. 
The evidence is then compared in a meta-regression analysis to infer whether the model 
specifications bias the evidence. Based on the relation between taxation and economic 
growth determined in the regression model I estimate the most probable effect on the 
economy of implementing flat tax schemes in the OECD countries. 
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For data collection, structuring, calculations and reporting I use Microsoft Excel, Office 2007 
version. For statistical reporting I use Minitab, release 15, a statistical software package. 
 
 
4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper combines the areas of taxation and regression. Taxation comprises 
microeconomic and macroeconomic theories; for the purpose of this paper the notions of 
tax wedge and deadweight loss, tax elasticity, and growth models are described here. The 
notion of supply side economics is also compared with the more common demand analysis 
framework. Then the Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal is discussed, before this section 
concludes with a description of the regression model deployed; a multiple regression using 
both binary indicator variables as well as interval variables. 
 
4.1 Tax Wedge and Deadweight Loss  
To illustrate the efficiency loss of taxes some fundamentals are explored. From the 
microeconomic theory the general equilibrium in a market is the intercept between supply 
and demand (𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆
∗ = 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷∗ ). Quantity supplied (𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆) depends on the price (𝑃𝑃) to the supplier; 
quantity demanded (𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 ) depends on the price to the customer. Assume linear supply and 
demand functions. Introducing a proportional tax 𝜏𝜏 in this stylized model will alter this 
equilibrium to 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 = 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(1 + 𝜏𝜏),          0 < 𝜏𝜏 < 1  
(1) 
where 𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾 denote intercept for the supply and demand functions, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛿𝛿 denote slope, and 
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(1 + 𝜏𝜏), i.e. the price to the buyer exceeds the price to the seller by the fraction of 
tax 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆. The tax wedge is then given by 
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𝑊𝑊 = 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷 + 0.5𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆�𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷∗ − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 ,𝐷𝐷�       = 0.5𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆�𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 ,𝐷𝐷 + 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷∗ � 
(2) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛿𝛿(1+𝜏𝜏)� is equilibrium supply, 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 ,𝐷𝐷∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 �𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝛿𝛿� is non-tax 
equilibrium supply, 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷  (= (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆)𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷) is government revenue, and where 
0.5𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆�𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 ,𝐷𝐷∗ − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆,𝐷𝐷� 
(3) 
is the deadweight loss. The market may be e.g. goods, services (𝜏𝜏 is a value added tax), or 
labor (𝜏𝜏 is an income tax). In Feldstein (1999) an equivalent formula for deadweight loss is 
augmented to include tax avoidance and to be based on taxable income elasticities. In 
macroeconomics the tax wedge is mostly referred to in terms of the difference between 
labor costs and net wage, either the tax is paid by the employer (payroll tax) or the 
employee (wage tax)8, hence omitting the deadweight loss. OECD define tax wedge as the 
“sum of personal income tax and employee plus employer social security contributions 
together with any payroll tax less cash transfers”9
From the deadweight loss implied by the tax wedge we may hence predict that there are 
efficiency gains from reducing taxes. As the stylized model was analyzed in terms of a 
proportional tax, progressive taxes are likely to yield even larger deadweight loss. This is 
confirmed in Feldstein (1999), and Hansen and Verdelin (2007), both of which also find 
effects on increased deadweight loss from increasing tax progressivity. Extending the 
deadweight loss formula to also include disincentives may yield higher effects, but as Hansen 
and Verdelin (2007) find the effects varies with the level of income. The notion of a 
deadweight loss implies that the other part of the tax wedge – government revenue – is 
spent as efficiently as would suppliers and buyers. Additional efficiency costs arise when this 
. However, e.g. Mankiw (1998) provides an 
entire chapter devoted to the costs of taxation. 
8 Who pays is actually irrelevant, as the tax burden depends on the elasticity of supply and demand (Mankiw 
(1998), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005)). The shares of tax burden is found by the pass-through fraction formula  
−𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷(𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 ) for the seller and 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆−𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 )  for the buyer, where the elasticities are of the form 𝐸𝐸 = �𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄� �∆𝑄𝑄∆𝑃𝑃�. 
9 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - Tax wedge Definition [http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7273] 
(Accessed 15.12.2008) 
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is not the case; however this is not captured by the deadweight loss formula10
4.2 Tax Elasticity 
. Ding (2008) 
finds however that a one percentage increase in the tax wedge can lead to about 0.09 
percentage decrease in labor productivity growth rate for the OECD countries. 
 
To compare the articles regardless different measures of output tax elasticities are 
estimated for each article, utilizing the methodology described by Philips and Goss (1995) 
where they refer to Bartik’s tax elasticity estimations11. Assume tax elasticity as the 
percentage change in real output caused by a one percent change in tax progressivity, where 
tax progressivity is defined as the ratio Ѳ = 1−𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠1−𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐, where 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠  is the lowest effective marginal 
tax rate and 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐  is the highest
12
where ∆𝛾𝛾 is efficiency gain, and m is the number of elasticity estimates. Using the tax 
progressivity ratio allows for inferring whether changes in output is due to changes in tax 
level or tax progressivity.  
 
. Then the average tax elasticity is 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑀𝑀 � � ∆𝛾𝛾−∆Ѳ�𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1  
(4) 
4.3 Growth Models 
The relationship between taxation and economic growth has been studied through 
numerous growth models. A brief summary of the basic models are presented next. Some of 
10 See Edwards and Mitchell (2008) for an analysis of how competitive governments are more efficient than 
monopolist governments. 
11 Bartik, Timothy J. (1991): Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? W.E. Upjohn 
Institute, Kalamazoo, Michigan. In this book Bartik estimated tax elasticities for economic activity based on 61 
studies. 
12 Tax progressivity ratio is a modified version of the ratio in Caucutt, Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2000). Vedder 
(1985) uses the definition τc − τs . Other studies use the Lorentz curve as basis for tax progressivity indices 
(Suits (1977), Stroup (2005)). 
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the calibration studies deploy the models directly, others use modified (adjusted or 
augmented) versions for improved interpretations. See the studies for complete model 
descriptions, also Farmer (1999), Romer (2001), Gärtner (2006), McCandless (2008), or other 
macroeconomic literature.  
 
4.3.1 The Solow Growth Model 
The neoclassical Solow growth model provides a basic fundament for growth analysis. 
Although the model has severe simplistic limitations (assuming exogenous growth, closed 
economy with no government, constant returns to scale) it is a good starting point for 
developing and interpreting models. The model assumes production of one single good 
determined by labor and capital (savings) supplied by households. The basic production 
function is of the form 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) 
(1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  denotes output at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴 is the scale parameter, 𝐾𝐾 is capital, and 𝐿𝐿 is labor. Net 
change in capital stock is given by 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 , where total savings is determined by 
output and a savings rate assumed fixed at a level 𝑠𝑠 = 1 − 𝑐𝑐  (c = consumption rate), and 
capital depreciate at a rate 𝛿𝛿. Steady state output and capital stock is found where total 
savings equals capital depreciation, i.e. where actual investment equals required investment. 
The golden rule of capital accumulation hence yields the highest steady state level of 
consumption at a savings rate 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾0∗
𝐴𝐴0𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾0∗,𝐿𝐿0) 
(2) 
A conceptual defect of the basic Solow model is that the model only explains differences in 
observed levels of output. Plosser (1992) emphasize that the Solow growth model, despite 
being a useful fundament, has severe limitations in understanding growth. By extending the 
model to not be bound by diminishing marginal productivity by expanding the capital term 
22
and by endogenizing technology development, public policies which affect savings and 
investment in physical and human capital, and technology development are central to long 
run growth. Gärtner (2006) states that the Solow model does not really explain economic 
growth, but treats growth exogenously “as a residual which the model does not even 
attempt to understand”. 
Extensions of the Solow growth model may however increase its explanatory value. First 
include Cobb-Douglas production function and human capital, taking the form  
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽 ,            𝛼𝛼 > 0,𝛽𝛽 > 0,𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1 
(3) 
where 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 is the physical and human capital share of income parameter, and 𝐻𝐻 denotes 
human capital. Then further inclusion of government will alter the net change in physical 
capital stock into 
∆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  
(4) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  denotes the budget balance, i.e. government revenue less government 
expenditure, and government expenditure is assumed non-human capital demanding. 
Assuming that the human capital sector is untaxed yields 
∆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 . 
(5) 
Finally, let changes in scale parameter and labor be explained by ∆𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  and ∆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑔𝑔 denotes technological progress and 𝑛𝑛 is population growth13
13 Extensions may also be done through the intensive form of the Solow growth model. 
. The augmented 
model now captures more parts of the economy, but still only income levels are explained, 
not why income grows. 
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4.3.2 The Ramsey Model 
The Ramsey model assumes many identical competitive firms. The production function is 
similar to the Solow model (1), however in this model the function is for each individual firm, 
assuming many firms in competitive markets. The firms are owned by a large number of 
identical households with infinite lives. A household divide its income from labor, capital and 
profits between consumption and saving. Each household member supplies 1 unit of labor at 
each point in time. The household utility function is 
𝑈𝑈 = � �𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡1−𝜃𝜃1 − 𝜃𝜃�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻�∞𝑡𝑡=0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡         𝜃𝜃 > 0,      𝜌𝜌 − 𝑛𝑛 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑔𝑔 > 0 
(6) 
 
where 𝜌𝜌 denotes time discount rate, 𝜃𝜃 is relative risk aversion, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is consumption of each 
household member at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  is total population, and 𝐻𝐻 is the number of households. The 
household’s budget constraint is 
lim
𝑠𝑠→∞
𝑒𝑒−𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠
𝐻𝐻
≥ 0 
(7) 
where the real interest rate (𝑟𝑟) variation is captured by 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = ∫ (𝑟𝑟𝜏𝜏)𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏=0 , and 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠  is total 
capital at time 𝑠𝑠. Let 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
=  𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  denote consumption per unit of effective labor. Households 
then maximize lifetime utility by 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔
𝜃𝜃
 
(8) 
where 𝑔𝑔 is the growth rate of 𝐴𝐴. Augmentation of the Ramsey model may further include 
Cobb-Douglas production function, leisure, variable labor, and tax. 
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4.3.3 The Overlapping Generations Model 
The basic overlapping generations model is a dynamic lifecycle model which captures 
heterogeneity among agents. An improvement from the Solow model is that the savings rate 
is endogenous. Population grows exogenously by a rate 𝑛𝑛, hence 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛𝑛)𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1. Agents 
live for two periods; at time 𝑡𝑡 the model assumes an infinite set of agents 𝐿𝐿 in generation 𝑡𝑡 is 
born, an infinite set of agents 𝐿𝐿 in generation 𝑡𝑡 − 1 is retired. Young agents supply 1 unit of 
labor each, income is divided between intraperiod consumption (𝐶𝐶1𝑡𝑡 ) and saving. Retired 
agents consume savings and interest earned (𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡+1). Agents’ lifetime utility given by 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑡𝑡1−𝜃𝜃1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 11 + 𝜌𝜌 𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡+11−𝜃𝜃1 − 𝜃𝜃           𝜃𝜃 > 0, 𝜌𝜌 > −1 
(9) 
where 𝜃𝜃 denotes relative risk aversion, and 𝜌𝜌 is the agent’s time discount factor. The lifetime 
budget constraint is the sum of initial wealth and the present value of lifetime labor income 
𝐶𝐶1𝑡𝑡 + 11 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡  
(10) 
where 𝑟𝑟 is real interest rate, and 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡  is labor income. In equilibrium agents maximize utility 
(6) subject to (7) which yields 
𝐶𝐶2𝑡𝑡+1
𝐶𝐶1𝑡𝑡 = �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+11 + 𝜌𝜌 �1 𝜃𝜃⁄  
(11) 
or that agents’ consumption over time depends on whether the real interest rate is higher or 
lower than the time discount factor. 
The production function is similar to the Ramsey model. In equilibrium firms earn zero profit, 
and capital and labor earn their marginal products. 
The augmented versions of this basic model provide significant improvements; I will only 
refer them here. The number of periods is infinite; agents may have different endowments 
(inherited capital, productivity, skills), and may even inherit from the previous generation; 
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each generation may consist of heterogenous agents; agents’ preference for leisure, taxation 
and government expenditure, and open economy features are included. Hence this 
overlapping generations model framework may provide good approximations to real-life 
economies. 
 
4.3.4 New Growth Theory 
The basic versions of the Ramsey model and overlapping generations model have similar 
defects as the Solow growth model in terms of exogenous growth in capital and labor. Their 
advantage is however that saving is endogenous and may be variable. The implicit effect of 
treating growth exogenously is that growth is temporary and will converge over time. This is 
hardly the case considering technological development, economies of scale and scope, and 
population growth. Hence, to capture the fundamentals behind growth, models with 
endogenous growth must be employed. As mentioned, augmenting the basic versions may 
yield models with endogenous growth, exemplified by most of the studies. Here the simplest 
endogenous growth model is presented; the AK model, an extension of the Solow model. 
Assume a human capital-augmented production function 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) where human 
capital and capital endowment per worker is related by 𝐻𝐻 = 𝐾𝐾/𝐿𝐿, hence reducing the 
production function to 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  
(12) 
which implies constant marginal productivity of capital. Net change in physical capital is then 
∆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  
(13) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 > 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  yields permanent growth. This is contrary to the converging long run 
growth from the previous described models. Furthermore, policies will affect growth, in that 
changes in the savings rate have direct and indirect effects on growth. 
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The four basic models described are the basis for all calibration studies used in the meta-
regression analysis. Methodologies used are either augmentations as described for each 
model, or extended/included into general equilibrium models or real business cycle models. 
 
4.4 Supply Side Economics 
Supply side economics is all about providing sound economic policies in terms of optimal 
framework conditions for growth and prosperity. Incentives (and disincentives) for 
individuals and businesses to supply capital and labor are recognized by this approach14
Although most economists agree on the role of government as provider of sound economic 
policies in terms of optimal framework conditions for growth and prosperity, little attention 
is paid to this when it comes down to economic modeling and research. In most 
macroeconomic literature Keynesian demand side economics receives substantially more 
attention, where the focus is on the role of government as provider of stabilizing fiscal 
policies in terms of demand adjusting measures. However history proves the countercyclical 
fiscal policy flawed due to a) decision lags; b) implementation lags; and c) impact lags of 
fiscal policies (Taylor (2000)). Hence the time from a countercyclical measure would have 
had the effect predicted by theory to the measure is effective may be long; so long that in 
some cases the measure turns into effect after the through (or peak in an overheating 
economy), amplifying the normalizing path of the economy (Bernoth, Hallett, and Lewis 
(2008)). The result is then similar to driving a car from one ditch to the other. It seems as 
. 
There has been extensive criticism towards this economic approach; however theory and 
empirics provides substantial support – as do common sense. People do not consume in 
order to work, they work in order to consume. As most proponents of supply side economics 
support the market as the way to organize society, most effort has been put into the 
reduction of impeding government interference in terms of regulations and fiscal policies. 
Taxation and tax reforms have received extensive attention, one of the propositions is the 
Hall-Rabushka flat tax which is presented later. 
14 Source: James D. Gwartney: Supply-Side Economics: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics | Library of 
Economics and Liberty. [http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SupplySideEconomics.html] (Accessed 
18.12.2006) 
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monetary and automatic stabilizers are better chauffeurs than the government providing 
(de)stabilizing fiscal policies. 
That government interference on demand factors only indirectly affects supply is also 
flawed. Supply is inevitably associated with demand, but is not a linear function of demand 
(as demand is not a linear function of supply). This is easily demonstrated by the fact that 
less than 50 percent of new businesses survive beyond 5 years after establishment15
The obvious relation is however the cost of supply. If costs exceeds income the supply 
disappears, i.e. the producer files for bankruptcy. As a major cost component for businesses 
is tax the obvious linkage extends to taxation (
. Supply 
depends on price (as a function of demand), costs, technology, expectations, framework 
conditions, capital stock, population growth, living standards, total factor productivity 
(Mankiw (1998), Miles and Scott (2005)). For labor supply there are also trade unions 
involved. Hence, and corresponding with the growth models presented above, the relation 
between aggregate supply and aggregate demand is not always easily observed. 
figure 5 shows total tax revenue for the OECD 
countries; this is the tax burden for businesses and individuals). Recalling the discussion on 
tax wedge and deadweight loss, this implies that if governments want to affect the economic 
growth, there is a linear relationship between taxation and supply. Because of this 
relationship governments must consider the supply side effects beyond the indirect effects 
of demand-side policies, if that is their path of choice. As stated initially, taxes should be 
levied fairly and in the least intrusive possible way. 
 
4.5 The Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax Proposition 
Hall and Rabushka (1995) propose an integrated flat tax which applies to both individuals 
and businesses. The main point is that taxing consumption is the least interruptive way of 
taxation. As value-added taxes do not allow for deductions for the poor this is considered 
less feasible. The indirect consumption tax (income less investment) allows for deductions, 
15 Source: OECD: Measuring entrepreneurship: a digest of indicators. 
[http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3343,en_2649_34233_41663647_1_1_1_1,00.html] and OECD: 
Workshop On Firm-Level Statistics, 26-27 November 2001. 
[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/62/2669736.pdf] (Accessed 17.12.2008) 
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and is also more predictable upfront. They suggest in their flat tax reform a flat marginal tax 
rate of 19 percent applicable to both business and individuals, and a fixed deduction of USD 
22,500 for a family of four (Social Security is abstracted from the reform). All other 
deductions, exemptions and tax credits are eliminated. The integrated flat tax form an 
airtight tax system, and is fair in that all income is taxed in the same proportion and only 
once, extinguishing the current double or even triple taxation of income, loopholes, and tax 
evasion. Fairness is thus maintained for both horizontal and vertical equity. The efficiency 
gain from removing disincentives of current tax schemes and introducing a flat tax reform is 
estimated to a 6 percent upward shift in output. Resources will also be allocated away from 
unproductive tax compliance expenditures, and tax planning (own effort, tax advisers, tax 
attorneys) for the taxed subjects, and from tax compliance control and investigation for the 
government. Tax compliance would be much easier; each of the tax forms fit on a postcard 
and is completed using common records. This would yield even larger efficiency effects. E.g. 
estimations by Robert E. Plamondon and David Zussman (Clemens, Emes, and Scott (2001)) 
show that administrative and compliance cost associated with business taxes to be 1.5 
percent of total tax revenue. 
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax has been used as basis for several reform proposals, such as the 
flat tax proposals by US Congressmen Dick Armey and Richard Shelby (majority leader and 
senator, respectively; see Bartlett (1994)), and by Steve Forbes (Forbes (2005)) in his 
candidature for the 1996 presidential primaries. Hall and Rabushka also provide advisory 
services to countries interested in adopting flat tax, including several of the Eastern 
European countries16
Robert Eisner and Herbert Stein (Hall, Rabushka, Armey, and Stein (1996)), and Foster (2002) 
put forward some criticism by arguing that human capital should be treated like physical 
capital in the flat tax scheme; if not human capital investments will be less attractive. 
Contrary to this, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) find that in general equilibrium skill 
formation increases as the higher earnings associated with college graduation are no longer 
taxed away at higher rates. Slemrod (1997) sums up main benefits and objections of the flat 
tax, and also a stepwise deconstruction from the current US income tax into the Hall-
. 
16 Robert E. Hall [http://www.hoover.org/bios/hall.html] 
Alvin Rabushka [http://www.hoover.org/bios/rabushka.html] 
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Rabushka flat tax. Robbins and Robbins (1996) provide a summary of the USA (Unlimited 
Savings Allowance) tax, proposed by Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici; a national sales 
tax; and the Hall-Rabushka flat tax. Koenig and Huffman (1998) provide insights in the short 
and long run dynamics of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax reform. The Hall-Rabushka flat tax is also 
well reviewed in Clemens et al. (2001), Emes, Clemens, Basham, and Samida (2001), and 
Heath (2006). 
Numerous other studies are supportive in terms of reducing tax progressivity and reduce the 
tax burden17
17 Famous promoters of the flat tax are Adam Smith (1776), John Stuart Mill (1900), David Ricardo (1911), 
Friedrich A. Hayek (1960), and Milton Friedman (1962;1980). Currently the idea of flat tax and other market-
liberal thoughts are promoted by epistemic communities (think-tanks) such as Adam Smith Institute (UK), Cato 
Institute (US), Center for Freedom and Prosperity (US), Civita (Norway), Fraser Institute (Canada), The Heritage 
Foundation (US), Hoover Institution (US), Institute for Policy Innovation (US), Ludwig von Mises Institute (US), 
and Reform (UK). 
 
. Slemrod (1990) argue that unless including the technology of collecting taxes 
optimal tax theory has little applicability. Innovative public economics are not always for the 
better. Mullen and Williams (1994) find that higher marginal tax rates are significantly 
associated with slower output growth, reducing growth rates by up to 25 percent. Based on 
a meta-regression analysis similar to the one applied in this paper, Phillips and Goss (1995) 
find that state and local government tax policy (US) has significant effects on economic 
development in that the tax elasticity range from -0.216 to -0.346. Aaberge, Dagsvik, and 
Strøm (1995) find that reducing income tax progressivity removes distortionary effects on 
labor. They suggest that moving further towards a flat tax scheme increases welfare and 
efficiency, and that the purely proportional tax scheme may move the economy close to its 
potential. Niskanen and Moore (1996), and Grecu (2004) provide statistics on US tax cuts 
and corresponding increase in tax revenue. Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) find that 
whereas consumption taxation only affects the choice between productive time and leisure 
time in favor of the latter and by that is growth reducing, taxation of factor income has 
additional distortionary effects, and is hence even more growth reducing. Carroll, Holtz-
Eakin, and Rosen (1998), and Gentry and Hubbard (2000) find that increasing marginal tax 
rates reduces both the investment level of existing entrepreneurs as well as the number of 
entrepreneurs entering the market. This is also confirmed in the review by Keith Godin in 
Fraser Forum (February 2008). Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm (2000) study labor supply 
responses and welfare effects for Italy, Norway and Sweden in flat tax scenarios. By applying 
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revenue neutral tax rates (1992 level) at 23, 25 and 29 percent, respectively, they find 
efficiency gains by shifting to a flat tax in all three countries. 
 
 
4.6 Meta-Regression Analysis 
4.6.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression Model 
Multiple regression analysis is the prediction of the value of a dependent variable based on 
other independent variables. It is the most applied statistical technique, providing 
information on both whether there is a relationship between the variables and the form of 
these relationships. The ordinary least squares regression model is of the form 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀 
(14) 
where 𝑦𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,…, 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  are the independent variables, 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1,…, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  
are the coefficients, and 𝜀𝜀 is the error variable. The standard error of estimate is  
𝑠𝑠𝜀𝜀 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘 − 1 
(15) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (𝑛𝑛 − 1)�𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦2 − �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑥𝑥 ,𝑦𝑦)�2𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥2 � denotes sum of squares for error, 𝑛𝑛 is the sample 
size, and 𝑘𝑘 is the number of variables. The coefficient of determination is given by 
𝑅𝑅2 = 1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
∑(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)2 
(16) 
and the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom 
𝑅𝑅2 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘 − 1)⁄
∑(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)2 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)⁄  
(17) 
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The validity of the model is tested by the hypotheses 
𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 0 
𝐻𝐻1: At least one 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎  is not equal to 0. 
The null hypothesis’ rejection region is 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼 ,𝑘𝑘 ,𝑛𝑛−𝑘𝑘−1  where 𝛼𝛼 is the significance level. The 
𝐹𝐹 statistic for this test is given by 
𝐹𝐹 = (∑(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�)2 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸) 𝑘𝑘⁄
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘 − 1)⁄  
(18) 
This implies that if the null hypothesis is true none of the moderator or parameter variables 
are linearly correlated with the dependent variable, and the model is invalid. If on the other 
hand at least one of the coefficients is not 0, the regression model is valid. 
For the coefficients the hypotheses are  
𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0 
𝐻𝐻1: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0 
with the test statistic 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
 which is Student t distributed with (𝜈𝜈 = 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘 − 1 degrees of 
freedom). The corresponding P-values denotes whether the null hypothesis is true (high P-
value) or not. 
The regression model may be used to estimate the expected value of the dependent 
variable. The confidence interval estimator of the expected value is then 
𝑦𝑦� ± 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 2⁄ ,𝑛𝑛−2𝑠𝑠𝜀𝜀�1𝑛𝑛 + �𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 − ?̅?𝑥�2(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥2 
(18) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔  is the given value of 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 , holding 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 ≠ 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔  constant. 
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4.6.2 Meta-Regression Analysis Framework 
Meta-analysis is the evaluation of empirical studies using statistical analyses of methods and 
data sets used in the studies. Meta-regression analysis is a form of meta-analysis designed 
for analyzing econometric economic studies. Using control variables for properties like 
methodology, variable definition, sample characteristics, and more, it is possible to infer 
around the obtained results for different studies. Until now the analysis is used for 
econometric studies only. In the field of interest there are not many econometric studies, 
and too few to make a robust meta-regression analysis. There are however several 
calibration studies on the topic of tax reform, not directly comparable with econometric 
studies as these use a different empirical methodology. Meta-regression analysis of 
calibration studies is hence a different approach which is presented in section 6 of this 
paper. As calibration studies are more vulnerable than econometric studies for specification 
bias, the cross-study analysis is most viable. 
The ordinary least square regression model is used to compare control variables – indicator 
variables for model structure, parameter variables for model parameterizations. The 
methodology for meta-analysis is based on Stanley (2001) which provides a step-by-step 
process for conducting an analysis. Card and Krueger (1995), Phillips and Goss (1995), 
Stanley (1998), Stanley and Jarrell (1998), Görg and Strobl (2001), and Jarrell and Stanley 
(2004) provides supplementary methodology in action. The meta-regression model is of the 
form 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=1                𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛 
(19) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is the average reported estimate in article 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎  are meta-independent 
variables characterizing the calibration studies in the sample in order to explain the variation 
in 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  s across the articles. 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎  is the coefficient of the 𝑎𝑎th control variable as listed in Table 2, 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is the error term. The articles are presented next. 
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5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Calibration Studies 
As the literature search illustrate, substantial academic effort has been placed on the flat tax 
and tax reform subject. To fit a brief summary of these studies into the paper would have 
put a viable highlight on the differences and similarities for the theoretical approach towards 
the flat tax issue. I will however have to limit the number of articles reviewed, although 
numerous additional articles are referred to throughout the paper. For an extensive 
summary of the academic literature see e.g. Heath (2006) and Clemens et al. (2001). 
Altig and Carlstrom (1991) study the interaction between inflation, taxation and 
macroeconomic performance in an overlapping-generations model as described by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff18
Jensen et al. (1994) study a tax reform where marginal tax rates are reduced and the tax 
base is broadened in a unionized labor market. They find that when wage formation is 
governed by union behavior and unions maximize the after-tax income of their members, 
the tax reform will be contractionary and welfare-reducing, yielding a long run loss of -4.1 
percent in output and -1.3 percent in aggregate welfare. As other aggregate variables shows 
. They find that the distortionary effects from inflation and tax 
structure interactions are reduced by 0.2 to 1.1 percentage points if a flat marginal tax rate 
scheme is introduced in place of the 1965 progressive tax structure. Furthermore they found 
the distortions to origin in labor supply behavior. 
Pecorino (1994) studies growth rate effects of US tax reforms based on the Lucas (1990) 
framework with an extended human capital production function. He finds that removing tax 
on physical capital earnings (from  a 36 percent rate) will increase the wage tax rate from 40 
to 45 percent and reduce annual per capita output growth rate by 0.13 percentage points. 
On the other hand, replacing the progressive 1985 income tax structure with a consumption 
tax will increase the per capita output growth rate by 1.06 percentage points annually. In 
this case the distortionary effects of taxation on both growth rate and labor-leisure decisions 
are reduced. 
18 Auerbach, Alan and Laurence Kotlikoff (1987): Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University Press. In this book 
the simulation framework is described in detail. 
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losses, a reform under these conditions is not feasible. On the other hand, when unions take 
into account the disutility of work of union members, long run output increases by 5.4 
percent and aggregate welfare by 4.5 percent. 
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) study the implications of preferences, technology and tax policies 
on potential effects of tax reform on the long run growth rate of the US economy. Modifying 
four studies they find that eliminating all taxes (which equals reducing tax progressivity to 1) 
will yield 0 - 0.33 percentage points increases in growth rate. The zero effect is found in their 
modified Lucas (1990) model (their labor elasticity function implies inelastic labor supply 
using Lucas’ parameterization). They further find that share parameters, intertemporal 
substitution and labor supply elasticities, depreciation rates, and tax treatment of 
depreciation and human capital production have significant effect on estimating growth 
effects. 
Ventura (1996) studies the implications of replacing the US income and capital income tax 
structure with the Hall-Rabushka flat tax. He finds that a revenue-neutral reform will have a 
flat marginal tax rate ranging from 18.5 to 30.7 percent depending on deduction levels and 
agents’ relative risk aversion. Furthermore, eliminating double taxation on capital income 
has a significant impact on capital accumulation, resulting in output increases ranging from 
12.98 to 17.88 percent. He also finds that aggregate welfare gains from introducing a flat tax 
range from 2.5 to 4.5 percent. 
Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1997a,b) study the impact of tax reforms on US economic growth; 
one flat rate consumption tax similar to the Hall-Rabushka flat tax, and one flat rate income-
based value-added tax. They find that a revenue neutral flat consumption tax at 21.7 percent 
yields a 3.3 percent increase in long run output, whereas the income-based tax with a rate at 
20.5 percent yields 1.4 percent higher long run output. They also suggest that reductions in 
compliance costs (USD 100-500 billion annually) would yield even higher gains, however this 
is not captured by the model. 
Rogers (1997) studies the effects of six different US tax reforms; flat marginal tax rate 
income, consumption, and wage taxes, with and without exemption levels. She finds that the 
more neutral tax system will have substantial efficiency effects, increasing long run output 
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by 1.72 – 6.03 percent, depending on the responsiveness in intertemporal and labor-supply 
decisions. 
Auerbach et al. (1997) study the macroeconomic effects of two tax reforms. They find that 
moving from the current US progressive income tax system to a flat income tax rate at 25 
percent with fixed deductions at USD 10 000 and USD 5 000 for each dependent will reduce 
long run output by 3 percent. All other aggregate variables are also reduced; hence this 
reform is not feasible. On the other hand, moving to a flat tax rate at 22.4 percent on 
consumption with capital income exemptions will increase output by 7.5 percent. 
Caucutt et al. (2000) study tax progressivity and economic growth. They find that reducing 
tax progressivity increases growth even when reducing flat marginal tax rates shows no 
effect. The effects of introducing flat rate taxes are significant, and aggregate welfare is 
unambiguously higher. Growth effects of eliminating tax progressivity amounts to 0.13 – 
0.53 percentage points on growth rate, welfare effects amounts to 0.38 – 1.31 percent. 
Altig et al. (2001) study the welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five 
fundamental alternatives to the US federal income tax. They find significant long-run gains in 
output and aggregate welfare in all cases. The estimated long run increases in output are: 
proportional income tax, 4.9 percent; proportional consumption tax, 9.4 percent; flat tax, 4.5 
percent, flat tax with transition relief, 1.9 percent; the X tax, 6.4 percent. Even in welfare 
increase in general, some groups will lose. 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) study the growth effects of shifting from the US progressive tax 
system to a flat tax similar to the Hall-Rabushka version. They find that the growth gain by a 
flat marginal tax rate at 34.37 percent and a pre-reform deduction level is between 0.009 
and 0.143 percentage points per capita depending on labor supply elasticity. Furthermore, if 
the pre-reform tax progressivity increases, the growth gains from introducing a flat tax will 
become even larger. 
Li and Sarte (2004) study progressive taxation and long run growth using progressive taxes 
(as opposed to approximated flat rate taxes) in growth models for the US. They find that the 
decrease in tax progressivity from the tax reform introduced by Reagan (TRA-86) increased 
the growth rate of output per capita by 0.12 – 0.34 percentage points. 
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Conesa and Krueger (2005) study the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in the US 
with regards to the highest expected utility of individuals (maximum social welfare). They 
find that the optimal tax code will increase welfare by 1.7 percent and is equivalent with a 
flat marginal tax rate of 17.2 percent and a fixed deduction of USD 9 400, yielding and a shift 
in GDP per capita of 0.64 percent. They also find that in the case of a pure proportional tax 
the shift would amount to 8.86 per cent. 
Carroll et al. (2006) study macroeconomic responses to three tax reforms presented by the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform using three economic growth models. The 
panel recommended two reforms which are hybrids of an income and consumption based 
tax. These are found to yield increases in output from 0.2 to 4.8 percent. The last reform, a 
progressive consumption tax, was not recommended by the panel, however the growth 
effects of this was even higher, ranging from 1.9 to 6 percent. This is consistent with other 
research proposing that taxing consumption rather than income have less distortionary 
effects on the economy. They also conclude that there are additional gains of tax reforms 
not included in the models which are likely to yield even larger growth effects. 
González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study a series of flat tax reforms for Spain. 
They find that output increases for reforms with flat marginal tax rates up to 28.19 percent 
and fixed deductions up to 0.40 percent of benchmark average income. Gains in output 
range from 12.6 percent in the strictly proportional case to 0.6 percent in the most 
progressive case. Increasing tax progressivity more will yield losses in all aggregate variables 
and is hence not feasible. Regarding welfare of the flat tax reforms they find that a marginal 
tax rate at 23.11 percent combined with a fixed deduction of 30 percent of per capita 
income will reduce the tax payables for the 60 percent with lowest incomes, and still yield a 
5.1 percent increase in output. 
Díaz-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study consequences of two revenue-neutral flat tax 
reforms in the US. In the lower progressivity case the flat marginal tax rate is 22 percent, 
fixed deduction is USD 16 000, output increase by 2.4 percent and productivity by 3.2 
percent, and a welfare loss at -0.17 percent. On the other hand, in the higher progressivity 
case the flat marginal tax rate is 29 percent, fixed deduction is USD 32 000, output decrease 
by -2.6 percent and productivity by -1.4 percent, and a welfare gain at 0.45 percent. The 
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contractionary results make this reform less feasible. Finally they conclude that flat taxes are 
better for the poor than progressive tax regimes. 
Office of Tax Analysis, US Department of the Treasury (2006) studies the economic effects of 
extending marginal tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003, set to expire ultimo 2010. They 
find that a continuation will have a significant effect on US long run economic growth. 
However, how the tax reduction is financed is of great importance – using future tax 
increases instead of reduced government spending may yield lower increase in output, 0.3 
percent comparing to 1.1 percent, and is strongly dissuaded. 
Elger and Lindqvist (2007) study the effects of a flat tax reform in Sweden. They find that a 
strictly proportional tax scheme with marginal tax rate at 31.95 percent increases long run 
output by 7.65 percent. Increasing the marginal rate and introducing deductions up to 20 
percent of benchmark income level will still yield gain in output by 0.69 percent, whereas a 
flat tax rate at 42.89 percent with 30 percent deduction on labor income reduces output by 
3.99 percent. The latter case yields losses in all aggregate variables and is hence not feasible. 
Aggregate welfare increases in all cases except for the most progressive scheme.  
 
5.2 Econometric Studies 
A useful assessment of the calibration results is to make a comparison with econometric 
findings. A number of articles on flat tax are left out of the meta-regression analysis due to 
their econometric methodology. These provide a useful benchmark in validating the growth 
effects on output. Some articles are presented here, others are referred to throughout the 
paper. 
Vedder (1985) studies the relationship between tax rates, tax structure and growth. Using 
panel data for the period 1963 – 1983 he finds that economic growth is positively associated 
with the flatness of the income tax, reducing tax progressivity leads to an increase in long 
run output per capita by 0.85 – 1.28 percent. 
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Koester and Kormendi (1987) study the impact of tax structure on growth rate and level of 
economic activity. They use panel data for 63 countries for the period 1970 – 1979. Findings 
are that revenue neutral reduction of marginal tax rates by 10 percent in developed 
countries yield 6.1 percent increase in per capita income (an upward shift in the growth 
path). They find no significant negative relation between tax rates and economic growth, 
however high marginal tax rates will shift factor utilization from labor to capital. 
Colombino and del Boca (1990) study labor supply and income distribution in Italy. Using 
1979 cross-section data they find that a linear tax reduces the dead-weight loss of the tax 
system by 43.75 percent19
19 This equals a 3.56 percent output growth (calculation based on 1979 GDP (national currency, constant prices, 
OECD base year) from OECD.Stat and 1979 total population from World Bank World Development Indicators). 
, but increases inequality. 
Padovano and Galli (2001) study the relationship between effective marginal income tax 
rates and economic growth. They use panel data for 23 OECD countries covering the period 
1951 – 1990. They find that effective marginal income tax rates are negatively correlated 
with economic growth, contradictory to most econometric literature which use average 
measures. The effect is estimated to 0 – 1.2 percentage points on growth rate. 
Lee and Gordon (2005) study the tax structure and economic growth in 70 countries. Using 
cross-section and panel data from 1970 – 1997 they find that statutory corporate tax rates 
are significantly negatively correlated with economic growth, whereas personal tax rates are 
less clear. They estimate that a 10 percentage point reduction in corporate tax rates will 
increase annual growth rate per capita by 1.1 – 1.8 percentage points. 
The econometric estimates appear to fit well into the range of the calibration study 
estimates. This is a confirmation both on the validity of the calibration models and the 
estimated associations between tax level, tax structure and economic growth. 
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6 META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
6.1 Sample Description and Modification 
For the calibration studies I follow the lead in Phillips and Goss (1995) and choose a set of 
moderator variables as shown in table 2. These are binary indicator variables (dummies) 
describing the characteristics of each study regarding measure, data source, and model 
structure. The meta-regression further includes the study parameterizations which Stokey 
and Rebelo (1995) find to be significant correlated with output estimations. As all but one 
article (González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006)) treat labor supply elasticity as 
endogenous this parameter is not included. Tax treatment of human capital is assumed 
being well covered by the dependent variable. A total of 20 control variables (k) are 
analyzed. 
In some cases the flat tax is in fact slightly progressive due to basic deductions (e.g. the Hall-
Rabushka flat tax), i.e. tax progressivity is larger than 1. In other cases the tax reform studied 
is not aiming for a flat tax, it only implies a change in the progressivity of the tax structure. 
For both of these I adjust for tax progressivity in the reform scenario when estimating tax 
elasticities, assuming the change in output comprises the full potential of tax progressivity 
change. 
The estimated effect on output relative to change in tax progressivity is shown in the 
dependent variable AVG_ELASTICITY. For all articles included in the meta-regression there is 
a negative correlation between change in tax progressivity and change in output, hence 
stronger effect is indicated by increasing negative elasticity. The articles are in the regression 
sorted by calibration benchmark year to be able to take into account differences in model 
calibrations as the modeled economies change. The descriptive statistics are shown in table 
8 and figure 12 (appendix I). 
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Table 2: Control Variables 
Moderator Variables 
CH_GROWTH = 1 if summary statistic is change in growth , = 0 if change in growth rate 
CH_PERCENT = 1 if summary statistic is change in percent, = 0 if change in percentage points 
CH_PER_CAPITA = 1 if summary statistic is change per capita, = 0 otherwise 
COUNTRY = 1 if study uses US data only, = 0 otherwise 
HETERO = 1 if study uses heterogeneous agents, = 0 otherwise 
PROP_TAX = 1 if study targets a strictly proportional tax structure, = 0 otherwise 
FLAT_TAX = 1 if study targets a proportional tax structure with basic deductions, = 0 otherwise 
OVERLAP_GEN = 1 if study uses an overlapping generations model, = 0 otherwise 
PRODUCTIVITY = 1 if study uses a productivity variable 
SKILL = 1 if study measure skilled/unskilled ratios, = 0 otherwise 
SOCIAL_SECURITY = 1 if study includes social security structure, = 0 otherwise 
POP_GROWTH = 1 if study allows for population growth, = 0 otherwise 
GOV_EXP = 1 if study includes government expenditure, = 0 otherwise 
INHERIT = 1 if study allows for inheritance between generations, = 0 otherwise 
RETIRE = 1 if study allows for retirement of labor, = 0 otherwise 
OPEN_ECON = 1 if study uses an open-economy model, = 0 otherwise 
 Parameter Variables 
CAP_SHARE = Physical capital share 
CAP_DEP = Depreciation rate of physical capital 
TIME_DISC = Intergenerational discount factor 
INT_SUBST = Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
 
 
 
Before conducting a regression analysis it is however necessary to deal with the issue of (n < 
k). As the number of moderator and parameter variables is larger than the number of 
articles some variables is omitted upon regression. The structure of the data in terms of 
correlation is shown in table 9 (appendix I). The Pearson correlation show that the number 
of variables being significantly correlated is relatively high, indicating a multicollinearity 
problem. There are 34 instances where moderator variables are significantly correlated; of 
which 8 at the 1 percent level, 14 at the 5 percent level, and 12 at the 10 percent level. 
Summarized, only 1 parameter variable is not significantly correlated with the other 
variables. Regression (1) on moderator variables (see table 10 in appendix II) illustrates the 
multicollinearity issue, where adjusted R-squared is 0, and the variance inflation factors 
range from 3.3 to 23.5. 
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6.2 Meta-Regression Analysis 
To manage these issues a backward stepwise regression is performed to exclude redundant 
moderator variables until a satisfactory model fit is reached. The backward stepwise 
regression takes the following path: First the moderator variables having most weighted 
instances of significant correlation is removed from the regression model, assuming the 
statistical properties of these are covered by correlated variables remaining. More weight is 
put on correlation at the 1 percent level than at the 10 percent level. Second, the parameter 
variables are initially biased towards the mean by replacing missing values by mean values. 
Each parameter variable contains from 2 to 8 missing values for different articles, which 
would result in 12 eliminated studies if not using the mean value or omitting the variables. 
The estimation bias is then controlled for in 18 regressions with different setups, where the 
preliminary model parameter variable coefficients are compared with parameter variable 
coefficients estimated under altering conditions. Finally, the least significant moderator 
variables are iteratively omitted until a satisfactory model fit is reached. 
Note that none of the moderator variables directly attached to measure (i.e. whether the 
change in output is measured at level or growth rate, in percent or percentage points, 
overall or per capita) will be omitted, even though both CH_GROWTH and CH_PER_CAPITA 
are significantly correlated with CH_PERCENT. Doing so would bias the regression model 
since these variables are crucial determinants of the measure, and as a result there is a 
probability of inferring other moderator variables to have too much or too little effect. This 
argument is verified in the following contradiction: The correlation between AVG_ELASTICITY 
and the three variables is significant at the 10 percent level for CH_GROWTH and 
CH_PER_CAPITA, and at the 5 percent level (close to the 1 percent level) for CH_PERCENT. 
Regression (2) shows on the other hand that none of the three variables have significant 
explanatory effect on AVG_ELASTICITY (see table 11 in appendix II). Furthermore, the 
variance inflation factors range from 1.3 to 2.7, which indicate a moderate correlation. These 
contradictory results verify the aforementioned multicollinearity. 
The following moderator variables are the most correlated with other moderator variables 
(count of instances at the 1 percent level; the 5 percent level ; the 10 percent level ): 
CH_PERCENT (3, 4, 1 - not omitted), FLAT_TAX (2, 6, 0), SOCIAL_SECURITY (2, 4, 2),INHERIT 
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(2, 2, 3), and RETIRE (3, 0, 3). They all have at least 2 instances of correlation at the 1 percent 
level, see table 10 in appendix I. The initial regression model (3) is hence 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽16𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
(20) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is the estimated average tax elasticity of article 𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎 𝑥𝑥 is the 
coefficient of the 𝑎𝑎th moderator or parameter variable as listed in table 2, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is the error 
term.  
The initial regression model fits the data extremely well. There are however two indications 
of that there is a high degree of multicollinearity still being present. First, from the Pearson 
correlation test (table 9) 9 moderator and parameter variables are significantly correlated 
with the dependent variable at either the 1, the 5 or the 10 percent level, which contradicts 
the regression model. In addition 3 instances have correlation close to but above the 10 
percent level. This test also shows that both CH_GROWTH and CH_PER_CAPITA are 
significantly correlated with CH_PERCENT at the 1 and the 5 percent level. Second, the 
variance inflation factors are still rather high, ranging from 3.6 to 22.2. 
In addition there might be a problem that the number of independent variables is almost 
equal to the sample size (16 and 19, respectively), even after removing the most correlated 
variables. Additionally omitting the variables PRODUCTIVITY and HETERO solves both this 
and the multicollinearity issues to a large extent. The final meta-regression model is of the 
form 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻_𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅_𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃_𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃_𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
(21) 
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The variance inflation factors are now in the range from 2.6 to 10.7, still indicating a degree 
of multicollinearity yet much more moderate than in the initial model. All variables are now 
significant, and the explanatory factor is still high. The model fit may however, as previously 
mentioned, be biased due to the use of means for missing values. To control for estimation 
bias each parameter variable is controlled in a total of 12 regressions. Missing values is used 
first to avoid bias, then maximum and minimum values are used to control for extremes. 
Subjecting the final regression model to altering parameter variables the results in table 14 
and figure 13 (appendix III) show that the estimated coefficients for CAP_SHARE, TIME_DISC 
and INT_SUBST holds relatively well. For CAP_DEP the testing shows high volatility in 
coefficient estimates. As the variable only has 11 observations this is reasonable. The bias 
towards the mean for all parameter variables must however be accounted for when drawing 
any conclusions. The results of the meta-regression analysis are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Results of Meta-Regression 
Dependent: Yi  
Regression 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 0.099 -0.057 -1.090 -1.215 
 
(0.29) (-0.70) (-5.97)** (-6.74)*** 
CH_GROWTH 0.259   0.023 0.286 0.310 
 
(0.59) (0.20) (7.23)** (6.97)*** 
CH_PERCENT -0.073 -0.169 0.185 0.111 
 
(-0.18) (-1.51) (3.42)* (2.49)* 
CH_PER_CAPITA 0.335   0.061 0.134 0.112 
 
(1.20) (0.69) (4.76)** (3.51)** 
COUNTRY -0.163 
 
0.350 0.266 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(4.74)** (4.21)** 
HETERO 0.126 
 
-0.053 
 
 
(0.46) 
 
(-2.02) 
 PROP_TAX -0.132 
 
0.091 0.105 
 
(-0.69) 
 
(4.04)* (4.42)** 
FLAT_TAX -0.373 
   
 
(-1.16) 
   OVERLAP_GEN -0.097 
 
0.137 0.082 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(3.67)* (2.71)* 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.046 
 
0.009 
 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.36) 
 SKILL 0.134 
 
0.245 0.240 
 
(0.59) 
 
(9.12)** (7.55)*** 
SOCIAL_SECURITY -0.020 
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(-0.07) 
   POP_GROWTH -0.019 
 
-0.171 -0.145 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-6.63)** (-5.80)*** 
GOV_EXP -0.170 
 
-0.394 -0.341 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-7.76)** (-6.73)*** 
INHERIT 0.205 
   
 
(1.01) 
   RETIRE -0.018 
   
 
(-0.06) 
   OPEN_ECON -0.102 
 
0.174 0.138 
 
(-0.49) (5.53)** (4.37)** 
CAP_SHARE 
  
-2.430 -2.230 
   
(-8.46)** (-6.81)*** 
CAP_DEP_PH 
  
-4.563 -6.224 
   
(-2.78) (-3.60)** 
TIME_DISC 
  
1.012 1.287 
   
(4.63)** (6.15)*** 
INT_SUBST 
  
0.787 0.712 
   
(8.18)** (7.35)*** 
     R-Square (percent) 87.1 33.1 99.7 99.1 
F-statistic 0.85 2.48 42.76** 32.06*** 
 
Coefficients (T-statistic in parentheses) 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Model Testing and Interpretation 
Comparing the standard error of residual from the analysis of variance with the mean of 
AVG_ELASTICITY it appears that the standard error of estimate is relatively large (S = 0.031 
versus μ = -0.141). On the other hand both unadjusted and adjusted coefficients of 
determination are high, indicating a good model fit. An F-test will show whether the null 
hypothesis may be rejected, implying the regression model be valid. At the 5 percent level 
the rejection region is 𝐹𝐹 > 𝐹𝐹0.05,14,4 ≈ 5.86. As the analysis of variance shows that 
𝐹𝐹 = 32.06 with a corresponding P-value of 0.002, there is strong evidence to infer that the 
model is valid. The multicollinearity is however still present. The residual plots show that the 
required conditions are met to a reasonable extent; the residuals are approximately normal 
distributed with constant variance, and yet they seem somewhat autocorrelated there is 
inconsistency in the plot order. Another test for autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson test. 
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The critical values for d0.05,19,14  are dL = 0.070 and dU = 3.642 (see table 3 in Savin and 
White (1977)). Testing the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.586) against these for positive and 
negative autocorrelation and the combination of these, the test is inconclusive. A Pearson 
test shows no evidence of correlation between average benchmark year and 
AVG_ELASTICITY. Summarized the statistics show that the model’s fit is good. 
It is worth mentioning that the final regression model’s statistics show slightly less fit than 
the initial model, even though the variance inflation factor is reduced by more than half. This 
indicates that the final model is more robust against interdependence between variables 
without losing explanatory value. 
For the coefficients the corresponding P-values denotes whether the null hypothesis is true 
(high P-value) or not. The latter case is denoted in the regression tables with the significance 
level of the T-statistic. At the 10 percent level all variables are significantly different from 0. 
The intercept is -1.215 and represents the predicted tax elasticity when all moderator and 
parameter variables are 0. The size and negativity of the intercept is not to be strictly 
interpreted, however it fits well with the direction given by the articles studied. The measure 
moderator variable coefficients are as one should expect but for CH_PERCENT and 
COUNTRY. The decreasing effect of using percent as opposed to percentage points is 
surprising, as the data clearly shows that the elasticities estimated for articles using 
percentage points are overall much lower than for the articles using percent. The coefficient 
may however be biased due to multicollinearity as its variance inflation factor is 8.7. Using 
US data will reduce the predicted elasticity by 0.266, however due to the low number of 
non-US studies in the regression this is not robust. If the overlapping generations model was 
utilized the predicted tax elasticity is reduced by 0.082. When the study includes population 
growth and government expenditure, the predicted tax elasticity increases by -0.145 and       
-0.349, whereas differences in skills and modeling an open economy reduce the elasticity by 
0.240 and 0.138.Not to draw any conclusions for the variables, this illustrates that more 
complex economic models do not necessarily alter the conclusions. The effects gained 
through some of the elements included may be eliminated by the losses from other 
elements. For the parameters the regression predicts that studies using high physical capital 
share and capital depreciation rate, and low intergenerational discount factor and elasticity 
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of intertemporal substitution, will estimate high tax elasticities. The preliminary model also 
indicates that including heterogenous agents will yield higher elasticities, whereas a 
productivity variable will have modest effects. 
The consistently good fit of the meta-regression analyses illustrates that calibration model 
specification and parameterization has significant effect on outcome. For the articles studies 
this imply that depending on the model structure and consequently parameterization the 
growth effects from reducing tax progressivity range from 0 percent (Stokey and Rebelo 
(1995)) to 17.88 percent (Ventura (1996)). The benchmark data set has less importance in 
terms of time. As tax policies in fact evolve over time in terms of tax progressivity, this 
indicates a model specification problem. See figure 6  for an illustration of tax progressivity 
in the US for the period covered by the articles. Intuitively, the effects of introducing a flat 
tax should be declining until 1988, increasing 1988 – 1993, and then stable until 2006, except 
for the lag between 2000 and 2002. For the articles studied no such conclusions can be 
drawn.  Comparing with the run chart in figure 7 there is a trend in broadening of model 
specification. This suggests that the earlier studies were more strict and static than the later-
coming, ignoring important effects of reducing tax progressivity. 
 
Figure 6: US Individual Income Tax 1968 - 2006
 
Source: Internal Revenue Services (IRS): SOI Tax Stats - 
Historical Table 23: U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal 
Exemptions and Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, 
and Tax Base for Regular Tax (1913 - 2006) 
[http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=175910,00.ht
ml] (Accessed 09.11.2008) 
 
Figure 7: Run Chart of Moderator Variables, 
US articles 
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 The model specification and parameterization bias may be reduced using the sufficient 
statistics methodology as put forward by Chetty (2008) as a way of bridging structural and 
reduced-form methodologies. As already mentioned, more complex models do not 
necessarily yield any differences in outcome.  The notion of constructing models which are 
transparent and credible and at the same time are useful for aggregate predictions is 
intriguing. Also the use of econometric derived sufficient statistics for calibration models will 
improve the prediction quality. 
The meta-regression analysis is concluded by a control of whether the final regression model 
yields a range similar to the growth effects from reducing tax progressivity in the calibration 
and econometric studies. The average elasticity for each study is estimated using equation 
(21). Means are used for missing values. Figure 8 shows that there is reasonable fit between 
predicted and estimated average elasticities. The predicted mean elasticity is -0.141 with 
boundaries -0.220 and -0.063 (95 percent confidence interval). This equals the mean of 
estimated average elasticity, but the boundaries are slightly wider (upper bound of 
estimated average is -0.211, lower bound is -0.072). Equation (4) is then reduced to 
∆𝛾𝛾 = −∆Ѳ𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  
(22) 
in order to derive efficiency gains from elasticities and changes in tax progressivity. The 
mean reduction in tax progressivity in the articles used in the meta-regression is 0.48. This 
implies that the average increase in long run growth is 6.75 percent for the articles analyzed, 
with upper and lower boundaries at 10.06 and 3.44 percent, respectively. The prediction is 
equivalent with the average of the range of study estimates, with boundaries at 10.51 and 
2.99 percent. 
Figure 8: Predicted Elasticities versus Estimated Average Elasticities 
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Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
7 INTRODUCTION OF FLAT TAX IN THE OECD COUNTRIES 
The marginal income tax rates in 2007 and the corresponding tax progressivity for the OECD 
countries are listed in Table 5. The personal allowance implies as before a lower marginal tax 
rate of zero. The total tax burden for persons is shown in figure 5, further comprising 
business taxes, value added taxes, and duties; including these would drive up the effective 
marginal tax rates extensively. E.g. according to the OECD Economic Survey of Sweden in 
2007, combining “social contributions, income and consumption taxes drives the effective 
marginal tax rate above 70% for over a third of the full-time employed, helping to explain 
why working hours for those employed are below the OECD average”20
20 OECD Policy Brief: Economic Survey of Sweden, 2007 [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/53/38081720.pdf] 
Accessed 29.11.2008 
. For comparison the 
top marginal income tax rate is 56.5 percent according to the OECD Tax Database. As the 
effective marginal tax rates are not readily observable (Padovano and Galli (2001)) these are 
not included in this analysis.  
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Table 4: Taxation of Wage Income in the OECD Countries (2007) 
Country  
Personal allowance / 
Tax credit* 
Marginal rate* 
Top marginal rates (all-
in)** 
Tax progressivity 
Australia  0.0 % 46.5 % 1.87 
Austria  0.0 % 42.7 % 1.75 
Belgium 6,040 25.0 % 59.3 % 2.46 
Canada 1,440 15.0 % 46.4 % 1.87 
Czech Republic 7,200 12.0 % 40.5 % 1.68 
Denmark 39,500 5.5 % 63.0 % 2.70 
Finland  0.0 % 56.1 % 2.28 
France  0.0 % 49.8 % 1.99 
Germany  0.0 % 47.5 % 1.90 
Greece 12,000 29.0 % 49.6 % 1.98 
Hungary  18.0 % 71.0 % 2.83 
Iceland*** 385,800 22.8 % 34.3 % 1.52 
Ireland 1,760 20.0 % 47.0 % 1.89 
Italy 18,400 23.0 % 50.7 % 2.03 
Japan 3,800,000 5.0 % 47.8 % 1.92 
Korea 1,000,000 8.0 % 38.3 % 1.62 
Luxembourg  0.0 % 48.3 % 1.93 
Mexico 7,083.84 3.0 % 22.6 % 1.29 
Netherlands 2,043 2.5 % 52.0 % 2.08 
New Zealand  15.0 % 39.0 % 1.39 
Norway 100,800 12.6 % 47.8 % 1.92 
Poland 572.54 19.0 % 42.7 % 1.74 
Portugal 221.65 10.5 % 48.4 % 1.94 
Slovak Republic*** 95,616 19.0 % 27.8 % 1.39 
Spain 5,050 15.7 % 43.0 % 1.75 
Sweden 11,900 0.0 % 56.5 % 2.30 
Switzerland  0.0 % 47.9 % 1.92 
Turkey  15.0 % 35.6 % 1.32 
United Kingdom 5,225 10.0 % 41.0 % 1.69 
United States 8,750 10.0 % 42.7 % 1.75 
Source: OECD Tax Database, Taxation of Wage Income Part I (2007) 
*) Table I.5. Central government personal income tax rates and thresholds. Personal allowance/ tax credit in local currency. 
**) Table I.4. Top marginal personal income tax rates for employee 
***) Flat tax scheme 
 
 
Bottom marginal tax rates are zero for all countries21
21 Zero tax rate, or equivalent deduction, according to OECD.Stat National Accounts. 
 except Hungary and New Zealand. 
Note that non-tax revenues – such as court fees, driving license fees, harbor fees, passport 
fees, and radio and television license fees where public authorities provide the service – are 
not included in the figures. 
51
7.1 Effects of Flat Tax Reforms on Economic Growth in the OECD Countries 
All articles used in the meta-regression analysis in section 6 are related to an OECD country. 
Also the econometric articles reviewed concern one or more (all) OECD countries. 
Comparing the results from the final regression model with estimations for the OECD 
countries will hence yield relevant estimates, if not directly transposable. The estimations 
are based on the relation between tax elasticity, tax progressivity, and economic growth 
which the meta-regression analysis find robust. As most of these studies consider long run 
growth effects this is also the emphasis in the following. The studies yielding efficiency gain 
as increase in growth rate are however consistent with the remaining and the effects on 
economic growth will be even larger if using this approach in a long-run analysis. 
The estimations on economic growth could for simplicity be based on the assumption that all 
OECD countries have similar average tax elasticity. When considering the wide range of tax 
burden in the OECD countries as shown in figure 1 this is however a too restrictive measure 
which would yield overestimated growth effects. On the contrary the tax burden might be 
partially interpreted as the realization of tax elasticity – higher tax elasticity will yield 
downward pressure on governments’ fiscal policies, and lower tax burden; whereas lower 
tax elasticities implies less restraint on the government from the society. This relation may 
also be interpreted by a Laffer curve (Blinder (1981), Mankiw (1998), Laffer (2004), Miles and 
Scott (2005)). The inverse U-shaped curve illustrates that increasing tax rates up to a certain 
point yields increased government revenue; beyond this tax revenue will decrease due to 
disincentive effects, i.e. reduced input and increased effort in tax avoidance. Tax elasticity 
defines the curve’s path (steepness and maximum), effective marginal tax rates define the 
current position at the curve, the sum being tax burden. Modeling and measuring this 
relationship is outside the scope of this paper, hence the more simple linear relationship 
between tax burden and tax elasticity is assumed22
22 Trabandt and Uhlig (2007) find that EU-15 is moving closer to peak of Laffer curve, yet is still at the left side of 
the curve. The US is also at the left side of the curve. Hence the approximation seems viable for most OECD 
countries. 
. Still, increased tax revenue may be 
expected, as a simplified and less intrusive tax scheme provides less incentive for evasion 
and avoidance (Hall and Rabushka (1995)). Schneider (2005) estimates the average shadow 
economy for 21 OECD countries to 16.3 percent. 
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Although the three non-US articles show elasticities well below the mean of the US articles (-
0.158), they are within the similar range (-0.503 – -0.003). A regression using the mean 
elasticity for the US, the elasticities for Sweden, Spain and Denmark, and the respective tax 
burdens in figure 1 indicates however that using the tax burden as proxy for tax elasticities is 
a reasonable approximation, see table 15 in appendix IV. This is also confirmed by a Pearson 
correlation test showing a correlation of 0.941 with a corresponding P-value of 0.059. The 
results are shown in table 5. Comparing the elasticity estimations using the regression 
equation for the US, Spain, Sweden and Denmark with the estimated average elasticities 
shows only small deviations. 
Table 5: Approximated Tax Elasticities for the OECD Countries 
Country Tax versus GDP Ratio Estimated elasticity Approximated elasticity 
Australia 30,60 
 
-0,130 
Austria 41,74 
 
-0,074 
Belgium 44,52 
 
-0,060 
Canada 33,33 
 
-0,116 
Czech Republic 36,92 
 
-0,098 
Denmark 49,14 -0,049 -0,037 
Finland 43,47 
 
-0,065 
France 44,17 
 
-0,062 
Germany 35,58 
 
-0,105 
Greece 31,32 
 
-0,126 
Hungary 37,08 
 
-0,097 
Iceland 41,52 
 
-0,075 
Ireland 31,88 
 
-0,123 
Italy 42,15 
 
-0,072 
Japan 27,90 
 
-0,143 
Korea 26,77 
 
-0,149 
Luxembourg 35,90 
 
-0,103 
Mexico 20,57 
 
-0,180 
Netherlands 39,32 
 
-0,086 
New Zealand 36,71 
 
-0,099 
Norway 43,94 
 
-0,063 
Poland 33,51 
 
-0,115 
Portugal 35,70 
 
-0,104 
Slovak Republic 29,77 
 
-0,134 
Spain 36,64 -0,074 -0,099 
Sweden 49,08 -0,035 -0,037 
Switzerland 29,61 
 
-0,135 
Turkey 24,52 
 
-0,160 
United Kingdom 37,12 
 
-0,097 
United States 
OECD - Total 
28,00 
35,95 
-0,158 
 
-0,143 
-0,103 
 
Source: Tax versus GDP ratio is from OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Revenue Statistics 1965-2007, 2008 
Edition, table 1. [http://www.oecd.org/ctp/revenuestats]. Elasticities are based on author’s own calculations. 
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The changes in tax progressivity are assumed to yield 1, i.e. a pure flat tax with no 
deductions. This extreme scenario is chosen to show the inherent potential of proportional 
taxes, although the Hall-Rabushka flat tax and most other suggested and implemented flat 
tax schemes also include fixed deductions which imply progressivity in the tax scheme. Using 
the purely flat tax also avoid entering an extensive analysis of tax rates and deduction levels, 
which are likely to be different for each country in that the current tax levels differ 
substantially (see table 4). 
Comparing the estimated average elasticity and tax progressivity reduction shows that for 
the articles studied, change in tax progressivity has a larger share of the efficiency gain than 
do change in tax rate. This is a supporting evidence for the flat tax scheme in that 
progressive tax structures have more adverse effects on output than do high tax rates. As 
most studies concern the US, which has relatively low tax progressivity among the OECD 
countries, the overall increase is expected to be somewhat larger. 
Tax progressivity for each OECD country is from table 4. The reductions in tax progressivity 
range from 0.29 to 2.45. By utilizing equation (22) the efficiency gains for the OECD countries 
are estimated based on the approximated tax elasticities and tax progressivity calculations. 
The potential effect on economic growth from shifting to a strictly proportional tax scheme 
ranges from 3.9 percent (New Zealand and Iceland) to a magnitude of 17.8 percent 
(Hungary). The unweighted average for the OECD countries is 9.16 percent. Figure 9 shows 
the individual estimations. These are then compared with other studies to control the 
validity of the estimates. 
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Figure 9: Growth Potential by Flat Tax Reform for the OECD Countries in 2007 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. Data derived from OECD.Stat and SourceOECD. 
 
The estimated results for 9 of the OECD countries are compared with findings in other 
studies. The comparison generally provides support for the estimations, as most studies find 
similar results, or including ranges of results. The countries compared, and the results, are as 
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- Canada (10.06 percent): Similar to the efficiency costs of the current tax scheme, which 
Diewert (1988) find to range from 10 to 20 percent. The estimation is higher than the 
efficiency gains referred to by Clemens et al. (2001) and Emes et al. (2001) – 2 – 4 
percent by capital formation, 3 percent by work incentives. In Fraser Forum (February 
2008) Alvin Rabushka and Niels Veldhuis also assume a 6 percent increase in output. 
- Denmark (6.23 percent): Slightly higher than the estimate of 5.4 percent in Jensen, 
Nielsen, Pedersen and Sorensen (1994). 
- Italy (7.38 percent): Comparable with Colombino and del Boca (1990) who estimate 
43.75 percent less inefficiency in the purely flat tax scheme. 
- Norway (5.75 percent): Exceeds the estimations in Stølen et al. (1999), where an analysis 
by Brita Bye, Erling Holmøy and Birger Strøm (Statistics Norway) show output effects 
ranging from -0.65 percent to 0.63 percent by revenue neutral tax reform (tax 
progressivity is reduced by half of the present reduction).The predicted efficiency gain is 
however in the small compared to the efficiency cost of 34.2 percent on welfare 
estimated in Aaberge et al. (2000). 
- Slovak Republic (5.16 percent): Relatively high, considering that the country already has 
a flat tax at 19 percent with a basic deduction. The growth potential hence indicates that 
even with a flat tax scheme the overall tax burden is still high, and hence illustrates the 
effect of reducing tax rates even further and removing the basic deduction. Krajčír and 
Ódor (2005) simulate between 0.2 and 0.5 percent annual growth in GDP from the 
present flat tax reform. 
- Spain (7.50 percent): Far less than the 12.6 percent efficiency gain found by González-
Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006), this is partially due to the difference in initial tax 
progressivity (they use 1999 as base year, whereas this paper uses 2007 as base year).  
- Sweden (4.80 percent): Lower than the 7.6 percent efficiency gain Elger and Lindqvist 
(2007) find when analyzing a pure flat tax scheme. 
- United Kingdom (6.74 percent): Similar to the loose estimations in Heath (2006).  
- United States (10.66 percent): Close to what Altig et al. (2001) find to be the effects of 
shifting to a proportional consumption tax. CBO, US Congress (1997) also refers to 
general equilibrium and structural macroeconomic models which yields increases in long 
run growth by 1 to 10 percent. Romer and Romer (2007) find even larger effects in their 
narrative analysis of tax changes, in that increasing taxes by 1 percent of GDP reduces 
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GDP by 3 percent. The estimation is however larger than the simulation result of 5.2 
percent by Allen Sinai referred to in Thorning (2002). This simulation is based on a flat 
tax introduced in 1991, and the GDP increase is simulated in 2004. There is however an 
upward trend, which might imply an even level of GDP in the long run. Thorning (2002) 
also presents results from 9 other studies on flat tax reforms, these ranges from -4.2 to 
16.9 percent output growth. 
The overall long run growth potential for the OECD countries fits well within the range of the 
calibration studies used in the meta-regression analysis. The increased growth effect (from 
6.75 based on the meta-regression to 9.16 percent) is partially due to the reduction in tax 
progressivity (0.89) being almost twice of the average reduction in (0.48). Compared with 
the econometric studies the estimate is similar to the growth effects of effective marginal 
tax rates which Padovano and Galli (2001) estimate to 1.1 – 1.2 percentage points on growth 
rate. The estimation shows a larger effect than what Koester and Kormendi (1987), and Lee 
and Gordon (2005) find, however they do not consider any change in tax progressivity. To 
illustrate the potential growth path of economic output in a scenario where all OECD 
countries introduce flat tax reforms, the estimated long run output growth of 9.16 percent 
for all OECD countries is added to actual GDP for the period 1997 - 2007. The most probable 
effect of flat tax reforms on economic output for the OECD countries is shown in figure 10. 
Engen and Skinner (1996) denote that even modest growth effects have large long run 
effects. To illustrate this figure 11 shows the accumulated foregone output for the period 
1997 to 2007. 
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Figure 10: Growth Potential by Flat Tax Reform for the OECD Countries 1997 – 2007 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. Data derived from OECD.Stat and SourceOECD. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Accumulated Foregone Growth Potential for the OECD countries 1997 – 2007 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. Data derived from OECD.Stat and SourceOECD. 
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The flat tax rates necessary for revenue neutral tax reforms estimated in the calibration 
studies range from 17 to 35 percent, hence the estimated growth effects imply that the flat 
tax rates be within these boundaries. This simplification restricts the possibility for inferring 
on the tax rates necessary for revenue neutral reforms. Intuitively, the effects on economic 
output will be larger than predicted if the flat tax rate is set lower than 17 percent, and 
smaller if the flat tax rate is set higher than 35 percent. See González-Torrabadella and 
Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Elger and Lindqvist (2007) for quantitative studies of the diminishing 
effects on output as the progressivity of flat tax schemes increases. 
Reducing tax progressivity to 1 shows the largest possible effect on output. This is not a 
feasible flat tax scheme for most OECD countries. The Hall-Rabushka flat tax with basic 
deductions will on the other hand provide a sound and middle-ground tax scheme where the 
considerations of the poor are taken care of. The tax rates and deduction levels are likely to 
differ as they are associated with the tax level in each country. Determining the necessary 
tax rates and the corresponding deduction levels for the flat tax schemes to be revenue 
neutral is not analyzed in this paper. However, as González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas 
(2006) point out, setting the tax rate and corresponding deduction level too high will have 
adverse effects on economic growth. For some high-tax countries the conclusion may hence 
be that the fundamental flat tax reform is not feasible unless accompanied by a fundamental 
reform of government expenditure. 
 
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The estimated growth for the OECD countries is based on estimations on tax elasticity and 
tax progressivity. The tax elasticities are based on estimated growth effects relative to 
changes in tax progressivity. Hence there might be an estimation bias present. To control for 
this the dependent variable is tested for the meta-regression variation and the estimation 
variation, based on the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimates from the meta-
regression analysis and for the OECD countries, respectively. The moderator and parameter 
variables are tested for meta-regression variation, based on ± 1 standard error of 
coefficients from regression (4). The results are shown in table 6 and table 7. 
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For the dependent variable the estimations used in the meta-regression analysis varies more 
than the estimations for the OECD countries. The wider range is reasonable as the estimates 
are based on the meta-regression elasticities ranging from -0.503 to -0.003, compared with 
the approximated elasticities for the OECD countries ranging from -0.180 to -0.037. The 
boundaries range from 14.02 to 2.09 percent in the meta-regression case. All control 
variables yield a similar range, indicating that the result from the regression model is robust. 
The moderator variables range from 9.29 to 4.21 percent, the narrower range confirms that 
tax elasticity has a smaller share of efficiency gain than do change in tax progressivity. As 
previously discussed the parameter variables are less robust; here the widest range is in the 
case of TIME_DISC, which ranges from 16.39 to -2.89. This confirms that parameter variables 
should be estimated carefully and with high precision, as even minor deviations may alter 
the result substantially. The control of coefficients in table 14 (appendix III) serves as a 
complimentary robustness check for the parameter variables. For the dependent variable in 
the estimates for the OECD countries the upper and lower boundaries are 11.08 and 6.85 
percent, respectively. 
The sensitivity analysis show that the estimated effects on economic growth from 
introducing flat tax in the OECD countries are robust, as TIME_DISC (low case) is the only 
incidence where the estimated growth is negative. The high case is however at the other 
extreme. The remaining 13 control variables yield consistent positive growth effects. 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis Dependent Variable 
Dependent: ∆𝛾𝛾 �����(percent) 
 
Yi 
                    ΔѲ 
High 
MRA (0.67)                     OECD (1.02) 
Low 
MRA (0.29)      OECD (0.76) 
High 
        MRA (-0.211) 
        OECD (-0.116) 
Low 
        MRA (-0.072) 
        OECD (-0.090) 
 
 
14.02 
 
 
4.80 
 
 
 
11.80 
 
 
9.19 
 
6.10 
 
 
2.09 
 
 
8.80 
 
 
6.85 
MRA – Estimate from meta-regression analysis 
OECD – Estimate for OECD countries 
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis Moderator and Parameter Variables 
Dependent: ∆𝛾𝛾 �����(percent) 
 
         ∆Ѳ����𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  
High                           Low 
Moderator Variables 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
COUNTRY 
PROP_TAX 
OVERLAP_GEN 
SKILL 
POP_GROWTH 
GOV_EXP 
OPEN_ECON 
Parameter Variables 
CAP_SHARE 
CAP_DEP 
TIME_DISC 
INT_SUBST 
 
 
8.43 
8.22 
7.07 
9.29 
7.46 
7.51 
7.39 
7.19 
8.66 
7.23 
 
11.44 
11.79 
16.39 
9.24 
 
 
5.08 
5.29 
6.43 
4.21 
6.04 
5.99 
6.11 
6.31 
4.84 
6.28 
 
2.06 
1.72 
-2.89 
4.27 
 
 
 
7.3 Some Inequality and Welfare Considerations 
In many studies where output is compared with equality, the efficiency gains in output from 
a flat tax come at the expense of vertical inequality. On this basis some of these studies, e.g. 
Decoster, De Swerdt, and Orsini (2008), Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer (2008), draw the 
conclusion that flat tax reforms are not feasible, particularly not for the OECD type of 
countries. This is confirmed in Nielsen (2006) where he finds that the main obstacles to the 
introduction of a flat tax in Norway have been a lack of the proposals’ ability to meet survival 
criteria of value acceptability, technical and political feasibility, and budgetary implications. 
The infeasibility does however stand in sharp contrast with public opinion, which in several 
OECD countries opposes the current tax schemes to a large degree23
23 Teather (2005) refers to a UK survey where 81 percent of young people are more worried about high tax 
levels than war, environment and tuition fees. 
The TaxPayers' Alliance September Poll 2007 for UK shows that 77 percent think government should tax 25 
percent or less from households. [http://tpa.typepad.com/about/2007/10/annual-conferen.html] 
In the 2007 Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Taxes and Wealth, 83 percent of the respondents said the 
federal income tax is very complex or somewhat complex. [http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr154.pdf] 
 
. Opposition might be 
even stronger, as Roberts, Hite, and Bradley (1994) find that a large share of respondents 
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prefers the progressive tax scheme when questionnaires use abstract frames but flat or 
regressive taxes in concrete situations, indicating that conclusions from public opinion polls 
using abstract questions should be carefully interpreted. Hence, as Nielsen (2006) and Evans 
and Aligica (2008) suggest, given a situation of a large policy window, or a policy champion, 
where the ideas, interests and consequences are aligned, the flat tax will be politically 
feasible also for the OECD countries24
Other studies also suggest that win-win scenarios might exist, where fairness is obtained 
without loss of welfare, and/or increased inequality. In general this is possible if and only if 
the improved incentives from tax reform result in increased efficiency and thereby increased 
income which more than offset the increased tax burden for those benefiting relatively more 
from current tax systems. Jensen et al. (1994) find that both efficiency and welfare increase. 
Aaberge et al. (1995) find that the reduction in tax progressivity in Norway from 1979 to 
1992 increased mean welfare, however the increase would have been even larger if a flat tax 
(20.1 percent rate, revenue neutral) was implemented. In the latter case inequality would 
also be reduced. Creedy (1996), and Cugno and Zanola (2000) find that flat tax schemes 
under certain conditions are preferable to more progressive tax schemes in terms of welfare. 
Seldon and Boyd (1996) find that the Armey-Shelby flat tax with a 17 percent overall tax rate 
will benefit all income groups; the lowest income group most by 7.6 percent, whereas the 
middle income groups benefit from 1.0 to 2.5 percent, and the highest income group benefit 
2.4 percent. Teather (2005) find similar results for UK. Kakwani and Lambert (1999) find a 
welfare loss of 1 percent due to the 1984 progressive tax scheme in Australia. Aaberge et al. 
(2000) find that a flat tax in Norway will both have large efficiency and welfare gains, and 
reduce inequality. They do however find that for Italy and Sweden only efficiency improves. 
Davies and Hoy (2002) find that the flat tax may reduce inequality compared to the 
.  
Paulus and Peichl (2008) suggest that the long run efficiency and growth effects of flat tax 
reforms might make the increasing vertical inequality acceptable. They also find that that for 
some Mediterranean countries, and other countries with similar tax structure, a flat tax can 
increase both equality and economic efficiency. 
24 According to Alvin Rabushka and Mart Laar, policy makers must be prepared, and they must stand the fight. 
Source: SPECTATOR.co.uk: Flat tax and faint hearts [http://www.spectator.co.uk/print/the-
magazine/cartoons/14303/flat-tax-and-faint-hearts.thtml] 
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progressive tax scheme, even without prohibitively high tax rates. Jorgenson and Yun (2002) 
find welfare gains of USD 814.9 billion for the Hall-Rabushka flat tax and USD 756 billion for 
the Armey-Shelby flat tax (1997 dollars). 
The argument that flat taxes increase vertical inequality might hence be based on valid 
concerns for some, hardly all OECD countries. On the contrary, the main reason for 
government reluctance might be that flat tax schemes are less susceptible to political 
pressure (Slemrod (1990)). If assuming that flat taxes do increase inequality, this should not 
be seen as only negative, as the implicit increased incentives will increase factor input. The 
latter is however critical dependent on whether the factor markets are provided with less 
rigidity (Vietor (2007)) (i.e. labor reforms will for some countries be necessary), and also that 
the masks in the social security net is widened so only those really needing may receive 
social benefits. Furthermore, by referring to the initial quote by Mill (1900) what the change 
in vertical inequality really shows is to what extent some groups or individuals benefit at the 
expense of the others under the current fiscal systems. A necessary implication of correcting 
this inequality and unfairness is hence that some lose and some gains. 
 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
This master thesis explores the effects of flat tax reforms on economic growth in the OECD 
countries, focusing on the period from 1997 to 2007. A meta-regression analysis on 18 
calibration studies on the subjects of tax reforms (of which 15 concerns US) summarizes the 
average growth potential to 6.75 percent. Extending the findings in the meta-regression 
analysis to current tax progressivity and economic growth the most probable growth effects 
for the OECD countries are estimated. The 2006/2007 level of tax progressivity and elasticity 
is estimated to yield a growth potential of 9.16 percent in real output for the OECD area. 
Controlling for estimation bias in parameter coefficients and prediction model, the 
conclusions remain robust. A recent OECD study (Arnold (2008)) confirms to a large extent 
my findings on the relation between taxation and economic growth. 
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The large Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policies currently implemented by most OECD 
countries are mostly short or medium term solutions. These measures could be 
accompanied, some even substituted by the long run solutions provided by flat tax schemes; 
the costs, if any, would not be close to the rescue deals already passed. As Alvin Rabushka 
notes in his Flat Tax blog on December 15, 2008; “Every group that benefits from a new 
provision becomes another political constituency for keeping and expanding it.”25
8.1 Limitations and areas for further research 
 
Countercyclical fiscal policies tent to yield more groups with increasing demands. 
The flat tax era is still infant, but the opportunities for change have improved. Flat tax 
reforms are likely to reduce the length and depth of the current worldwide economic 
downturn, to speed up recovery and future growth and prosperity. 
 
Two extensions of interest appear which are related to the measuring of the necessary flat 
tax rates and corresponding deduction levels for the OECD countries in a Hall-Rabushka flat 
tax scenario. First, a measure including only income and business tax is of interest. This may 
be the most feasible reform today due to constraints in partisan politics. The second 
extension of interest is a measure which also includes the removal of value-added taxes, 
hence completely extinguishing double taxation as intended by Hall and Rabushka (1995). 
Using estimations for growth rates as opposed to long run growth is also intriguing, 
especially when considering short-sighted policy makers. 
The meta-regression analysis might be further developed to include the endogenous labor 
supply elasticities as pointed out by Stokey and Rebelo (1995). For the purpose of this paper 
the exogenous parameterization is a reasonable measurement of the parameters’ effects on 
output estimates. The meta-regression analysis is limited to flat tax articles using calibration 
methodology. A similar analysis with articles using panel data or cross-section 
methodologies (e.g. Vedder (1985), Koester and Kormendi (1987), Colombino and del Boca 
25 Flat tax – Essays on the Adoption and Results of Flat Tax Around the Globe [http://flattaxes.blogspot.com/] 
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(1990), Padovano and Galli (2001), Lee and Gordon (2005)) would provide additional insights 
on results of existing research, and set direction for future framework and modeling efforts. 
The tax elasticities in the predictions are average for each country; an extension of the 
model might be to estimate tax elasticities for different income groups for each country. A 
comparable measure is the elasticity of taxable income, which Gruber and Saez (2000) find 
to differ as much as the tax elasticities differ between the countries. This will also affect the 
growth effect of a flat tax reform. 
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Appendix I: Meta-Regression Analysis: Descriptive Statistics 
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 Appendix II: Meta-Regression Analysis: Regression Models 
 
 
Table 10: Regression (1): All Moderator Variables 
Variable           Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
COUNTRY 
HETERO 
PROP_TAX 
FLAT_TAX 
OVERLAP_GEN 
PRODUCTIVITY 
SKILL 
SOCIAL_SECURITY 
POP_GROWTH 
GOV_EXP 
INHERIT 
RETIRE 
OPEN_ECON 
 
0.099 
0.259 
-0.073 
0.335 
-0.163 
0.126 
-0.132 
-0.373 
-0.097 
0.046 
0.134 
-0.020 
-0.019 
-0.170 
0.205 
-0.018 
-0.102 
 
0.29 
0.59 
-0.18 
1.20 
-0.75 
0.46 
-0.69 
-1.16 
-0.38 
0.33 
0.59 
-0.07 
-0.12 
-0.72 
1.01 
-0.06 
-0.49 
 
Standard error of residual = 0.165865 
R-Square = 87.1 % 
R-Square (adjusted) = 0.0 % 
F-statistic = 0.85 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.10338 
n = 19 
Count of unusual observations = 0 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87
 
 
 
Table 11: Regression (2): Measure Moderator Variables 
Variable           Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
 
-0.057 
  0.023 
-0.169 
  0.061 
 
-0.70 
0.20 
-1.51 
0.69 
 
Standard error of residual = 0.138007 
R-Square = 33.1 % 
R-Square (adjusted) = 19.7 % 
F-statistic = 2.48 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.62801 
n = 19 
Count of unusual observations = 1 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
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 Table 12: Regression (3): Meta-Regression Model – Equation (20) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
COUNTRY 
HETERO 
PROP_TAX 
OVERLAP_GEN 
PRODUCTIVITY 
SKILL 
POP_GROWTH 
GOV_EXP 
OPEN_ECON 
CAP_SHARE 
CAP_DEP_PH 
TIME_DISC 
INT_SUBST 
 
-1.090 
0.286 
0.185 
0.134 
0.350 
-0.053 
0.091 
0.137 
0.009 
0.245 
-0.171 
-0.394 
0.174 
-2.430 
-4.563 
1.012 
0.787 
 
-5.97** 
7.23** 
3.42* 
4.76** 
4.74** 
-2.02 
4.04* 
3.67* 
0.36 
9.12** 
-6.63** 
-7.76** 
5.53** 
-8.46** 
-2.78 
4.63** 
8.18** 
 
Standard error of residual = 0.0249480 
R-square = 99.7 % 
R-square (adjusted) = 97.4 % 
F-statistic = 42.76** 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.85710 
n = 19 
Count of unusual observations = 2 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
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 Table 13: Regression (4): Meta-Regression Model – Equation (21) 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 
CH_GROWTH 
CH_PERCENT 
CH_PER_CAPITA 
COUNTRY 
PROP_TAX 
OVERLAP_GEN 
SKILL 
POP_GROWTH 
GOV_EXP 
OPEN_ECON 
CAP_SHARE 
CAP_DEP_PH 
TIME_DISC 
INT_SUBST 
 
-1.215 
0.310 
0.111 
0.112 
0.266 
0.105 
0.082 
0.240 
-0.145 
-0.341 
0.138 
-2.230 
-6.224 
1.287 
0.712 
 
-6.74*** 
6.97*** 
2.49* 
3.51** 
4.21** 
4.42** 
2.71* 
7.55*** 
-5.80*** 
-6.73*** 
4.37** 
-6.81*** 
-3.60** 
6.15*** 
7.35*** 
 
Standard error of residual = 0.0307101 
R-square = 99.1 % 
R-square (adjusted) = 96.0 % 
F-statistic = 32.06*** 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.58587 
n = 19 
Count of unusual observations = 0 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
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Appendix III: Meta-Regression Analysis: Control of Parameter Variable 
Coefficients 
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Appendix IV: Prediction Preparation 
 
 
Table 15: Elasticity versus Tax Burden 
Variable           Coefficient T-statistic 
Intercept (𝛽𝛽0) 
TAX/GDP RATIO 
 
-0.284 
  0.005 
 
-5.35** 
3.95* 
 
Standard error of residual = 0.227430 
R-Square = 88.6% 
R-Square (adjusted) = 83.0% 
F-statistic = 15.6 
n = 4 
Count of unusual observations = 0 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively 
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